The failure of universal theories of tort law by Goudkamp, James & Murphy, John Roger
1 
 
THE FAILURE OF UNIVERSAL THEORIES OF TORT LAW 
 
 James Goudkamp* and John Murphy** 
 
Many scholars have offered theories that purport to explain the whole of the law 
of torts. At least some of these theories do not seem to be specific to a single 
jurisdiction. Several appear to endeavour to account for tort law in at least the 
major common law jurisdictions, or even throughout the common law world. 
These include Ernest Weinrib’s corrective justice theory, Robert Stevens’s rights 
theory, and Richard Posner’s economic theory. This article begins by explaining 
why it is appropriate to understand these three theories as universal theories of tort 
law, which is an important feature of these theories that has not hitherto been 
properly appreciated. This explanation draws upon various overt claims (or other 
strong intimations) made by the theorists themselves to the effect that this is how 
their respective accounts should be understood. The article then proceeds to test 
these theories, all of which are leading accounts of tort law, against the evidence 
in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. Not all of these 
theories have received a proper airing in these major common law jurisdictions, 
which is a gap in the literature that this article seeks to fill. The parts of tort law on 
which we focus are (1) the breach element of the action in negligence, (2) the law 
that determines when a duty of care will be owed in respect of pure economic 
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loss, (3) the law that governs the availability of punitive damages, (4) the defense 
of illegality and (5) the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and its descendants. The article 
concludes that none of the theories is a satisfactory universal account of tort law. 
All of them suffer from significant problems of fit in that they cannot 
accommodate (often even approximately) the areas of law that we discuss. While 
all of the theories contain valuable insights, they fall well short of accomplishing 
that which they are held out as providing. In the course of this analysis, the article 
explains why this is an appropriate line of criticism and identifies the degree of 
lack of fit that we regard as being “significant”. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
It is currently fashionable to offer accounts of tort law that purport to explain it in its entirety. 
Every few years, a new theoretical model appears on the market, and is touted as the best 
explanation on offer. Take, for example, Ernest Weinrib’s The Idea of Private Law.1 
Although this book is addressed to private law generally,2 it quickly emerges that Weinrib’s 
main mission is “to understand tort law”.3 His most fundamental contention is that “Tort 
liability reflects corrective justice”,4 and much of Weinrib’s book is an attempt to demonstrate 
“the immanence of corrective justice in tort law”.5 For instance, in Chapter 6, Weinrib takes 
his readers to features of “negligence liability [that] illustrate… the formalist idea that 
corrective justice is immanent within a sophisticated system of private law”.6 In Chapter 7, 
                                                 
1  Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (1995). 
2  Id. at 20.  
3  Id. at 3.  
4  Id. at 134. 
5  Id. at 171.  
6  Id. at 146. 
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Weinrib’s goal is to prove that several of tort law doctrines that are generally thought to 
impose strict liability – a form of liability which Weinrib regards as inconsistent with 
corrective justice7 – properly understood “are either extensions of fault liability or are ways in 
which the common law regulates the use of property in accordance with corrective justice”.8 
The foregoing makes it explicit that Weinrib’s overarching enterprise is to show that his 
corrective justice theory fits tort law.  
 More recently, Robert Stevens has offered an alternative explanatory account of tort law. 
In Torts and Rights,9 Stevens defends what he calls the “rights model” of tort law. According 
to this model, “[t]he law of torts is concerned with the secondary obligations generated by the 
infringement of primary rights. The infringement of rights, rather than the infliction of loss, is 
… the gist of the law of torts”.10 In endeavoring “to show … the truth”11 of this conception, 
Stevens deals systematically with numerous aspects of tort law. He argues that “the rights-
based model of the law of torts gives a better account of the common law as we find it”12 than 
other models. Stevens’ claim therefore also is tort law conforms to his explanation of it.  
 As a final illustration of a writer who offers an explanatory theory of the whole of tort law, 
consider Richard Posner. In his Economic Analysis of Law, Posner contends that tort law (and 
the law generally) “is best (not perfectly) explained as a system for maximizing the wealth of 
society”.13 The opening sentence of The Economic Structure of Tort Law, which he co-
authored with William Landes, claims that “the common law of torts is best explained as if 
the judges who created the law through decisions operating as precedents in later cases were 
                                                 
7  See Part IIE2 below.  
8  Weinrib, supra note 1, at 172. 
9  Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (2007). 
10  Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).  
11  Id. at 3.  
12  Id. at 306.  
13  Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 25 (7th ed. 2007). 
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trying to promote efficient resource allocation”.14 In these works (and in a staggering number 
of other contributions15) Posner draws attention to many aspects of tort law that he believes 
substantiate this claim.  
 The foregoing theorists all seek to explain tort law, as the quotations that we have supplied 
make abundantly clear. Whether or not they succeed in their endeavour is one of the most 
important questions in modern private law scholarship. In order to answer it, it is necessary to 
judge the theorists by reference to the body of law that they purport to explain. Does the 
explandum fit the explanans? It is necessary to ascertain, therefore, the legal system or 
systems with which the theorists in question are concerned As far as we can tell, this essential 
foundational work has not previously been performed. 
 Stevens is explicit regarding the jurisdictional scope of his theory. In Torts and Rights he 
writes: “I have focused on English cases for no better reason than that this is the material 
which I know best. However, the book would look much the same if I had primarily used the 
case law of any other common law jurisdiction”.16 Stevens’s claim that his theory is 
applicable to the common law world as a whole could scarcely be made more starkly, and he 
has elsewhere specifically attempted to extend it to Australia.17 By contrast, Weinrib does not 
make it crystal clear with which jurisdiction or jurisdictions he is concerned. Nowhere in The 
Idea of Private Law (or, so far as we can tell, in any of his many other relevant writings) does 
                                                 
14  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 1 (1987).  
15  See especially Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 Journal of Legal Studies 29 (1972); Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 International Review of Law & Economics 127 (1981); 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 851 
(1980); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law, 12 Journal of Legal Studies 109 
(1983); Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law § 4 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Richard A. Posner, Instrumental and 
Noninstrumental Theories of Tort Law, 88 Ind. L. J. 469 (2013). 
16  Stevens, supra note 9, at vii (emphasis added). 
17  See Robert Stevens, The Divergence of the Australian and English Law of Torts, in Torts in Commercial Law 
§ 3 (Simone Degeling, James Edelman & James Goudkamp eds., 2011).  
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Weinrib state explicitly which countries he is discussing.18 Nonetheless, he seeks to support 
his theory by reference to many cases from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. The fact that he proceeds in this way strongly suggests that there is sufficient 
uniformity in the law in these jurisdictions to entitle him to draw on materials from any of 
them. And, given this assumption of substantial uniformity, he presumably also believes that 
the theory that he builds from the law in several jurisdictions must in turn apply to those 
jurisdictions. Overt confirmation that his theory is intended to be multi-jurisdictional in terms 
of its explanatory power appears in more recent work. Although he stops short of naming 
particular jurisdictions, Weinrib does state that his theory is applicable to “the private law 
relationships, as found in sophisticated legal systems”.19 At a minimum, then, this confirms 
the fact that Weinrib does not regard his theory as being confined to just one jurisdiction. 
Similar remarks can be made about Posner’s work. In defending his economic explanation of 
tort law, Posner does not specify the full array of legal systems with which he is concerned. 
But, as with Weinrib, he tellingly often cites, without any words of qualification, decisions 
from the United States and the United Kingdom in support of his theory.20 In Law and Legal 
Theory in the UK and USA not only does Posner write that “in general English judges use 
their common sense effectively to approximate the results that an economic analyst would 
recommend”,21 he also does nothing to distinguish the very many different common law 
jurisdictions found in the United States. He therefore clearly believes that the various systems 
                                                 
18  The same can also be said of Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (2007), which offers an 
important elaboration of Weinrib’s theory of tort law as applied to the tort of negligence.  
19  Ernest J. Weinrib, Civil Recourse and Corrective Justice, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 273, 291 (2011).  
20  For an illustration of Posner drawing on English authorities, see Landes and Posner, The Positive Economic 
Theory of Tort Law, supra note 15, where the landmark cases of Rylands v. Fletcher, LR 3 HL 330 (H.L.), 
Bolton v. Stone, AC 850 (H.L.), Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co, 11 Exch 781 (1856), 156 Eng. Rep. 
1047 (Exch 1856) and Paris v. Stepney Borough Council, AC 367 (H.L.) are cited.  
21  Richard A. Posner, Law and Legal Theory in the UK and USA viii (1996). 
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of tort law in the United States and in the United Kingdom are sufficiently similar that his 
economic theory is the best explanation available of tort law in both countries.22  
 As we have just noted, there is compelling evidence – in both the form of explicit claims 
and strong intimations – that Weinrib, Stevens and Posner are all concerned with tort law 
throughout the common law world. The daring nature of their claims is therefore hard to 
overstate. For, not only do they assert that they can account for all of tort law within a single 
jurisdiction23 (itself a tall order), they claim also to have an explanation of tort law that is 
valid across all common law jurisdictions.24 They are offering, for want of a better 
description, universal theories of tort law. Their self-imposed task is to show that their 
respective models are the best available. The main purpose of this article is to test whether 
their theories can justifiably be rolled out throughout the common law world.  
 As is obvious from what we have said so far, the critique that we will employ in this article 
is one based on fit. We consider this to be an appropriate way of engaging with the theories. 
How could it not be given that the target theorists themselves, as we have shown, are 
fundamentally concerned to demonstrate that their accounts fit the law? Indeed, this type of 
criticism is entirely conventional.25 This does not mean, however, that this article adds 
nothing to existing treatments of the theories in question. Our enquiry is original in what it is 
testing, namely, whether the theories in issue constitute plausible universal theories of tort 
                                                 
22  See especially id. § 2. We are not alone in reading Posner in this way: see, e.g., Stevens, supra note 9, at 92. 
23  It is axiomatic that none of these theorists is concerned with, for instance, just one tort or a handful of torts. 
Their accounts are addressed to tort law generally.  
24  Some of these theorists may go further still by not merely claiming that they can account for tort law as it 
presently exists, but for all of its history. Consider, e.g., Stevens, supra note 17, at 39 where he asserts that 
the rights model of tort law has a longer history in the law than other models. Weinrib’s claims seem not to 
be limited to common law jurisdictions: see the text accompanying supra note 19. 
25  See, e.g., Andrew Burrows, Damages and Rights in Rights and Private Law § 10 (Andrew Robertson & 
Donal Nolan eds., 2012) and John Murphy, Rights, Reductionism and Tort Law, 28 OJLS 393 (2008) (testing 
Stevens’s rights theory against English law); Peter Cane, Corrective Justice and Correlativity in Private Law, 
16 OJLS 471 (1996) (tackling Weinrib’s corrective justice theory in the context of English tort law); Jane 
Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1529 (2006) 
(arguing that the descriptive claims of Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory are problematic when assessed 
against tort law in the United States).  
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law. This article also makes a series of further substantial contributions to existing 
scholarship. We mention four further ways in which the analysis that we offer is important. 
First, revealing that the theories in question are universal in nature opens the door to a novel 
line of criticism, namely, the fact that the theorists in question, despite the universal nature of 
their accounts, frequently cherry pick rules that are consistent with their models and attempt 
to marginalise or simply ignore incompatible rules located in other jurisdictions. Secondly, 
many of the problems of fit that we canvass have not previously been identified, and certainly 
not treated at any length. Thirdly, no writer, as far as we know, has looked at the theories 
under consideration simultaneously. Examining them alongside each other for the purpose of 
determining how satisfactorily they accommodate particular aspects of tort law reveals 
features of the theories – and weaknesses in them – that have not previously been recognised. 
Fourthly, most of the theories under consideration have usually been put to proof only in just 
one or two jurisdictions.26 This article, uniquely, subjects the theories to scrutiny in all of the 
major common law jurisdictions.  
 As we have noted, the universality of our target theories is not a feature of them that 
previously has been recognised let alone subjected to sustained critique.27 It is important to 
appreciate that investigating the theories as universal theories is a worthwhile enterprise even 
if Weinrib, Stevens and Posner had confined their theories to just a single jurisdiction. In 
other words, even if each of these theorists had intended to limit his theory to a single 
jurisdiction – which it is clear they did not, given the quotes and features of their work that we 
have just mentioned – it would nonetheless useful to determine whether their theories could 
be extended to other jurisdictions. 
                                                 
26  Id.  
27  See the text accompanying supra notes 16-24. 
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 We concentrate on the theories of tort law advanced by Weinrib,28 Stevens and Posner. We 
are conscious of the fact that variations on the ideas propounded by these theorists have been 
developed by other writers,29 and that there are also distinct theories of tort law on offer. 
However, we focus on the writings of these target theorists partly because of limitations of 
space but primarily because their theories are in vogue.30 They are all deservedly very widely 
discussed,31 and they can fairly be described as leading theories of tort law. We occasionally 
refer to the writings of other theorists. In particular, we refer periodically to the scholarship of 
Goldberg and Zipursky. Goldberg and Zipursky have also developed a theory of the entirety 
of tort law – their “civil recourse theory”.32 There are compelling reasons to believe that they, 
                                                 
28  Weinrib, perhaps to a greater degree than the other theorists with whose work we are concerned, has changed 
his tune in relation to his model of tort law in certain important respects. This is not surprising given the 
length of time over which Weinrib has been writing. This observation, we hasten to add, is not meant as any 
criticism. On the contrary, we read Weinrib has having strived to refine and clarify his important account. 
However, for the purposes of this article we look mainly to his seminal work, The Idea of Private Law 
(Weinrib, supra note 1), although we take account in various places of certain of his other writings. We have 
chosen to proceed in this way for two main reasons. First, The Idea of Private Law is the most sustained 
defense of his corrective justice model that has he offered by a considerable margin. Secondly, it is important 
to ascertain whether the analysis that Weinrib advances in The Idea of Private Law is valid despite the fact 
that Weinrib may have retreated or modified certain of the claims that he made in it. This is because simply 
because Weinrib has changed his position in relation to certain points not mean that he is correct to have done 
so.  
29  Jules Coleman, for example, has offered several versions of his corrective justice theory of tort law, all of 
which differ in certain respects from that of Weinrib: see Jules Coleman, Risks and Wrongs §§ 16-18 (1992). 
30  Although Posner’s scholarship belongs to what is often call the “first wave” of law-and-economics analysis, 
and although later generations of economic analysis have been predominantly concerned to supply 
prescriptive rather than explanatory accounts of the law, there is little or nothing of Posner’s pioneering work 
that is now considered by law-and-economics scholars to be obsolete or wrongheaded. Rather, it is generally 
taken to be foundational, and in this sense retains current appeal. For a detailed account of the various 
“waves” of North American law-and-economics scholarship, see Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American 
Jurisprudence 301-419 (1995). 
31  Weinrib’s work on corrective justice has been the subject of at least one symposium: Formalism, Corrective 
Justice and Tort Law Symposium: Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One’s Neighbors 
in 77 Iowa L. Rev. i (1992). Stevens’s rights theory is the main focus of Rights and Private Law (Donal 
Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012). Some of the articles in which Posner developed his economic theory 
of tort law (see the sources mentioned in supra note 15) are, of course, some of the most cited law journal 
articles in the world.  
32  Their writings are voluminous. Their main contributions (writing separately or together) include Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law Torts, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1998); John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1625 (2002); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, 
Not Corrective Justice, 91 Geo. L. J. 695 (2003); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and 




too, intend their theory to be universal in nature.33 However, we have not selected them for 
separate treatment. Their account is in several key respects very similar to Stevens’s.34 
Goldberg and Zipursky condemn attempts to understand tort law as a system for allocating 
losses caused by accidents and instead “argue… for the descriptive superiority”35 of a rights-
based (or, as they generally prefer to put it, wrongs-based) view. We have chosen to focus on 
Stevens rather than on Goldberg and Zipursky primarily because he generally applies his 
theory to more of the rules in which we are interested in this article than do Goldberg and 
Zipursky and because Stevens’ theory is nakedly universal in its claims. However, what we 
say about Stevens’s theory, we believe, often also holds true for Goldberg and Zipursky’s, 
although we do not seek to establish that this is the case.  
 At the end of this article, we anticipate and seek to fend off at length a variety of general 
objections that might be pressed against our analysis. We explain why it would be 
unconvincing to respond to our analysis by asserting, among other things, that the theories in 
question are somehow immune to being criticised on the basis that they do not fit the law, that 
                                                                                                                                                        
theory can be found in John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 917 
(2010). 
33 Goldberg and Zipursky are much less clear than one would hope on the issue of which system or systems of 
tort law they are endeavoring to explain. (We are not alone in thinking this: see, e.g., John Gardner, Torts and 
Other Wrongs, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 43, 43 (2011).) At a minimum, they are endeavoring to explain tort law 
in the United States since they cite materials from a wide range of jurisdictions in that country. But they also 
frequently reference English decisions, and seem to suggest that English tort law and United States tort law 
are siblings rather than distant cousins by use of the phrase “Anglo-American tort law” (see, e.g., Goldberg 
and Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 32, at 968). When they speak at gatherings of Commonwealth 
lawyers they do not modify their theory (see, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights and 
Responsibility in the Law of Torts in Rights and Private Law § 9 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 
2012), which is based on a lecture that they delivered in England), and the same can be said of articles that 
they publish in Commonwealth law journals (see, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse and the 
Plurality of Wrongs: Why Torts are Different, New Zealand Law Review 145 (2014)). It is reasonable to 
infer, therefore, that they too consider that their theory holds true throughout the common law world.  
34  Some writers also see a strong connection between the work of Goldberg and Zipursky and Weinrib’s 
corrective justice theory. See, e.g., Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39 Fla. 
St. U. L. Rev. 107 (2011); Weinrib, supra 19. Cf. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, supra 
note 32. We do not deny that these theories have much in common. However, we see the link between 
Stevens and Goldberg and Zipursky as being the closer one. And, either way, it is possible to bracket, at least 
in a rough and ready way, the work of Goldberg and Zipursky with that of other scholars.  
35  Goldberg and Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 32, at 920 (emphasis added).  
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the theories are interpretive theories rather than explanatory and that we have ignored aspects 
of tort law that the theories can explain. However, a doubt that might be entertained in 
relation to our enterprise that we want to address squarely at the outset is whether it makes 
sense to test the theories in question as universal theories. It might be thought that it would be 
better to ask, first, whether the theories are plausible accounts of tort law in their “home” 
jurisdictions before testing them against a range of common law jurisdictions. There are two 
points that we want to make in this connection. The first point is that work of this kind 
already largely has been done elsewhere. Complaints have often been made that the theories 
concerned do not fit the law in specific jurisdictions.36 We see no point in covering such 
ground again (although the fact that we highlight problems of fit in a range of jurisdictions 
means that those earlier studies will receive incidental support from the present article). By 
contrast, our aim is examine whether the theories in question are plausible universal theories 
of law – a fundamentally different and novel line of enquiry. The second point is that it is 
doubtful that the theories really have a “home” jurisdiction. As we have shown, the authors of 
the theories in question clearly do not confine themselves to individual jurisdictions. This 
previously unrecognised feature of the theories reveals that it is inadequate merely to test the 
theories against the law in just one jurisdiction (which is all that existing analyses have done). 
The theories under consideration are universal theories and it consequently is important that 
they be tested as such. This work has not been performed to date, and it is this significant gap 
in tort law scholarship that this article fills. 
 The bulk of this article is contained in the next part. We test in that section the theories 
offered by Weinrib, Stevens and Posner against tort law in Australia, Canada the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Our overall conclusion from this analysis is that the theories 
in question suffer from significant problems of fit. The scale of the problems is such that we 
                                                 
36  See, e.g., the sources mentioned in supra n 25. 
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are unpersuaded that any of them is a satisfactory universal theory. As promised, we conclude 
the article by anticipating and addressing some general objections that might be levelled 
against our analysis.  
 
II.  FIVE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS OF FIT FOR THE UNIVERSAL THEORIES 
 
In this part of the article, we discuss problems of fit that the three theories in question 
encounter when they are applied to the law in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. We assess the theories by reference to five areas of tort law: (1) the breach 
element of the action in negligence; (2) liability for negligently inflicted pure economic loss; 
(3) punitive damages; (4) the defense of illegality; and (5) the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and 
its descendants.  
 We have selected these areas primarily because they present significant problems of fit for 
the theories under consideration qua universal theories. We concentrate on significant 
problems of fit because we are eager to avoid it from justifiably being suggested that we have 
selected de minimis problems. (We recognise that, inevitably, there will be at least some 
mismatch between a theory of a given area of the law and the law in that area.) What do we 
mean by a “significant” problem of fit? We regard a problem of fit as being “significant” if it 
is: (1) well out of line with a core tenet of the theory concerned; (2) of practical importance by 
virtue of the regularity with which it is applied; and (3) found in a multiplicity of 
jurisdictions. This is, we think, an extremely demanding test for significance. We have 
deliberately set a particularly high bar (and probably far higher than is necessary37) so that 
                                                 
37  The fact that we have built into our test for significance a wide margin of error means that it is unnecessary 
for us to pinpoint the degree of mismatch that must exist between a theory and a body of law before a 
problem of fit properly can be said to exist. See further Part III below.  
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there is no doubt that the problems of fit that we identify below as significant genuinely are 
significant.  
 Needless to say, many other problems of fit additional to those that we have just mentioned 
also exist, but we confine ourselves to these five problems because they meet our exacting test 
of significance. We discuss each of the five problems in turn, explaining why they present 
difficulty for Weinrib’s corrective justice theory, Stevens’s rights theory and Posner’s 
economic theory. We do not always consider these theories in the same order as we believe 
that the best sequence in which to address them depends on the area of law in question.  
 It is vital to appreciate that the goal of this part of the article is not to highlight differences 
in the law between the jurisdictions with which we are concerned. Simply drawing attention 
to such differences would be pointless for current purposes. That is because the theories in 
question may be able to account for more than one rule that governs a given factual scenario. 
Proceeding in this way also may result in important problems of fit being overlooked since a 
rule that a theory cannot explain may be adopted in all of the jurisdictions in issue. The 
overarching aim of this part of the article is, rather, to explain why rules that are found in the 
jurisdictions in issue cannot be accommodate by the theorists in question. 
 
 A. The Breach Element of the Action in Negligence 
 
1. Economic theory 
 
Different tests are used in different parts of the world to determine when the breach element 
of the action in negligence is satisfied. According to conventional wisdom, the test that is 
used in the many jurisdictions in the United States is that propounded in United States v. 
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Carroll Towing Co.38 American law students are usually taught that, in this famous case, 
Judge Learned Hand laid down an algebraic formula for ascertaining whether the defendant 
had breached his duty of care. According to this formula, the breach element is determined by 
reference to the probability of damage to the plaintiff materialising (“P”), the burden of taking 
precautions (“B”), and the loss that the defendant’s conduct caused to the plaintiff (“L”). If 
PL is greater than B the defendant is adjudged to have breached his duty. 
Although the Hand formula has been enshrined in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm39 and is accepted as representing the law by many 
American treatise writers,40 we acknowledge that some scholars consider it to have at best a 
shaky foothold in American tort law.41 Carroll Towing is not, actually, even a tort case (it is 
an admiralty case), and in it Judge Learned Hand was dealing with the plaintiff’s fault rather 
than the defendant’s. However, for the purposes of this analysis, we will proceed on the basis 
that the conventional understanding is correct, namely, that the Hand formula specifies when 
the breach element will be satisfied in the United States.  
The Hand formula is presented by Posner as powerful evidence in support of his theory of 
tort law.42 Indeed, it is probably fair to say that the Hand formula is the main jewel in the 
crown of that theory. Posner claims that the Hand formula is used not just in the United States 
but also in the United Kingdom, even if it is not on the lips of the English judges.43 He writes: 
                                                 
38  159 F 2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir, 1947). 
39  § 3. Wright describes this section as “explicitly adopt[ing] an almost totally unconstrained, reductionist, cost-
benefit test of reasonableness in negligence law”: Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in 
Negligence Law, 47 American Journal of Jurisprudence 143, 161 (2002).  
40 See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton on Torts 173 (David Owen, et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984); Dan Dobbs, The Law of 
Torts 340-348 (2000). 
41  See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula”, 4 Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law 1 (2003); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1999 (2007).  
42 See, e.g., Landes and Posner, supra note 14, at 85-88. 
43 Posner’s claim that the formula is rarely mentioned by English judges is correct. Indeed, it is mentioned only 
exceptionally in Commonwealth jurisdictions more generally. We searched high and low for references to the 
Hand Formula by Commonwealth judges. We were able to unearth only a handful of occasions on which it 




“I do not know how many English judges have heard of the Hand formula. But I think that if 
it were explained to them they would accept it as a fair description of the modern English law 
of negligence”.44 The relevant problem for Posner is that the Hand formula is simply not used 
outside of the United States. It has been stressed by the courts in several jurisdictions that the 
breach element is not determined in a mathematical way or by a calculus.45 Furthermore, 
factors other than those referred to in the formula are often considered. As McHugh JA said in 
the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Western Suburbs Hospital v. Currie: 
“Negligence is not an economic cost/benefit equation. Immeasurable “soft” values such as 
community concepts of justice, health, life and freedom of conduct have to be taken into 
account”.46 Equivalent statements have been made in other jurisdictions.47 Textbook writers 
in Commonwealth countries, while they often refer to the Hand formula in passing, do not 
suggest that it constitutes the law in the jurisdiction with which they are concerned.48 For 
                                                                                                                                                        
NSWLR 511, 523-524 (C.A.); Rentway Canada Ltd/Ltée v. Laidlaw Transport Ltd, (1989) 49 CCLT 150, 
para 46 (H.C.J.); Cekan v. Haines, (1990) 21 NSWLR 296, 306 (C.A.); Ultramar Canada Inc v. 
“Czantoria”, (1994) 84 FTR 241, para 125 (Aust. Fed. Ct.); Opron Construction Co v. Alberta, (1994) 151 
AR 241, para 702 (Alta. Q.B.); Dovuro Pty Ltd v. Wilkins, [2000] FCA 1902, (2000) 182 ALR 481, para 96; 
Re Commins and Civil Aviation Safety Authority, [2004] AATA 1330, (2004) 86 ALD 637, para 23; Twin 
Cities Mechanical & Electrical Inc v. Progress Homes Inc, (2005) NLTD 134, (2005) Nfld & PEIR 314, para 
41; Gemoto v. Calgary Regional Health Authority, [2006] ABQB 740, (2007) 2 WWR 243, para 21; 
Blackstrap Hospitality Corp v. Aztec Amusements, (1992) Ltd, [2009] ABQB 74, para 88. 
44  Posner, supra note 21, at 41 (footnote omitted).  
45  “Reference to ‘calculus’, ‘a certain way of performing mathematical investigations and resolutions’, may 
wrongly be understood as requiring no more than a comparison between what it would have cost to avoid the 
particular injury that happened and the consequences of that injury”: New South Wales v. Fahy, [2007] HCA 
20, (2007) 81 ALJR 1021, para 57 (footnote omitted); “What is involved … is not a calculation; it is a 
judgment”: Mulligan v. Coffs Harbour City Council, [2005] HCA 63, (2005) 223 CLR 486, para 2. 
46 (1987) 9 NSWLR 511, 523 (C.A.). The High Court of Australia has made similar remarks on several 
occasions: see, e.g., New South Wales v. Fahy, [2007] HCA 20, (2007) 81 ALJR 1021, paras 6, 125 (stressing 
that the breach element of the tort of negligence is not resolved by way of a “calculus” and cannot be 
determined in a scientific or mathematical way).  
47  E.g., in Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] AC 40, 65 (H.L.) Lord Reid remarked that “[t]he idea of negligence is … 
insusceptible of exact definition”. 
48  E.g., John Fleming, speaking principally about Australian law, noted that “the reasonable person is by no 
means a caricature cold blooded, calculating Economic Man”: John G. Fleming, Fleming’s the Law of Torts 
para 7.130 (Carolyn Sappideen & Prue Vines ed. 10th ed. 2011). This passage is materially identical to the 
corresponding one in the last edition of this book that Fleming himself authored: John G. Fleming, The Law 
of Torts 132 (9th ed. 1998). 
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these reasons, Posner’s account suffers from significant difficulty when applied outside the 
United States. 
It might be thought that this conclusion has been reached too hastily since Posner has never 
actually claimed that the Hand formula is employed anywhere with mathematical precision. It 
might also be argued that the Hand formula is broad enough, in principle, to allow for all 
costs and benefits to be weighed, and not merely those that are economic in nature. On this 
basis, the Hand formula could be seen as capable of accommodating the “soft” values referred 
to by McHugh JA. Such values are, it might be said, simply certain nominate factors that are 
relevant to a cost-benefit analysis. Despite some ostensible appeal, this line of argument 
ultimately is unpersuasive. To begin with, the various “soft” values of liberty, justice and life, 
are not easily cashed out in economic terms. This is important because judicial consideration 
of factors that are not reducible to economic values is flatly inconsistent with Posner’s purely 
economic theory of tort law. Furthermore, we doubt whether Commonwealth courts simply 
balance all costs and benefits for the simple reason that “life, liberty and justice” are 
incommensurable values. They cannot be compared according to any common metric. This, 
too, is highly significant since Posner’s economic model is predicated on relevant 
considerations being susceptible to being weighed. 
 
2. Corrective justice 
 
For the other theorists with whom we are concerned, the converse problem exists. That is, 
they are unable to explain the fact that the Hand Formula is used in the United States. This is 
properly conceded by Weinrib. He admits that his theory cannot accommodate the Hand 
formula because that formula takes cognizance of the burden on the defendant of taking 
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precautions.49 Pursuant to his theory, a factor that is relevant to liability must be bilateral in 
the sense that it is concerned with the relationship between the parties.50 However, the cost to 
the defendant of taking precautions is not something that connects the parties to each other. It 
is a unilateral consideration that is concerned solely with the defendant. Whereas Weinrib 
admits, therefore, that his corrective justice theory does not accommodate the law regarding 
the breach element of the action in negligence in the United States (surely a major 
concession), he claims that his theory fares much better when attention is turned to other 
jurisdictions. He says that “the English and Commonwealth approach to reasonable care 
ignores [the burden on the defendant of avoiding the risk] almost completely”.51 Weinrib is 
badly mistaken here about the state of the law (a fact that seems to have passed wholly 
unnoticed by other scholars). Although it is true that the cost to the defendant is not always as 
explicitly and directly factored into the determination of the breach issue by Commonwealth 
courts as it is by the Hand formula, the suggestion that the cost to the defendant of taking 
precautions is irrelevant or nearly irrelevant is manifestly false. Weinrib’s analysis of the law 
on this point52 relies heavily on the landmark Australian case of Wyong Shire Council v. 
Shirt.53 There, in one of the most celebrated opinions in Australian tort law, Mason J said that 
the cost of taking precautions is a factor to consider in determining whether the defendant 
breached his duty. His Honor wrote: “The perception of the reasonable man’s response calls 
for a consideration of the magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its 
occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action 
                                                 
49  Weinrib, supra note 1, at 148. 
50  Id. at 120-121. 
51  Id. at 148. 
52  Id. at 148 n 2.  
53  (1980) 146 CLR 40 (Aust. H.C.). 
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and any other conflicting responsibilities which the defendant may have”.54 Shirt, therefore, 
far from supporting Weinrib’s theory, actually undermines it.  
Weinrib also cites the famous English case of Bolton v. Stone55 in support of his claim that 
in Commonwealth jurisdictions the burden on the defendant of avoiding the risk in question is 
“ignor[ed] … almost completely”.56 In this case the plaintiff was injured when she was struck 
by a cricket ball that had been hit out of the grounds. It is true that Lord Reid’s opinion 
contains some remarks that are in tune with Weinrib’s position. For example, his Lordship 
said, “I do not think that it would be right to take into account the difficulty of remedial 
measures. If cricket cannot be played on a ground without creating a substantial risk, then it 
should not be played at all”.57 However, it is very doubtful whether Lord Reid really meant to 
say that the practicability of taking precautions is irrelevant, given that in two subsequent 
cases he indicated that the cost of precautions should be taken into account.58 Furthermore, 
even if he did hold that view when he delivered his speech in Bolton v. Stone, it is doubtful 
whether that section of his speech forms part of the ratio decidendi of the case. The Appellate 
Committee that heard the appeal in Bolton v. Stone comprised five law lords. The Committee 
unanimously upheld the finding of the trial judge that there was no breach of duty, and all five 
law lords delivered speeches. Only Lord Reid can be read as suggesting that the cost of taking 
precautions could be disregarded in that case, a fact that Weinrib omits to mention.  
                                                 
54  (1980) 146 CLR 40, 47-48 (Aust. H.C.) (emphasis added). This passage has essentially been put on a 
statutory footing in many Australian jurisdictions: see, e.g., Civil Liability Act (NSW) § 5B (2002).  
55  [1951] AC 850 (H.L.). 
56  Weinrib, supra note 1, at 148. 
57  [1951] AC 850, 867 (H.L.) 867. 
58  In Morris v. West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co, [1956] AC 552, 574 (H.L.) 574 Lord Reid said that “the 
difficulty and expense and any other disadvantage of taking the precaution” must be weighed in deciding 
whether there is a breach of duty. Also, in the Wagon Mound (No 2), [1967] 1 AC 617, 642 (P.C. (Aust.)) 
642, he opined that “a reasonable man would only neglect ... a risk [of very small magnitude] if he had some 
valid reason for doing so, e.g., that it would involve considerable expense to eliminate the risk”. 
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Many English judges,59 and judges elsewhere in the Commonwealth,60 have said that the 
cost of taking precautions is relevant (though by no means central) to the issue of breach of 
duty. It is thus unsurprising that commentators have noted that the cost to the defendant of 
taking precautions is a salient factor in determining whether the breach element of negligence 
is satisfied. John Fleming, for example, summarising the gist of the authorities, wrote: “That 
the cost [to the defendant of avoiding the risk of injury] … is a relevant factor cannot be 
doubted”.61 Because the cost of implementing risk-prevention measures is a factor to consider 
in deciding whether there has been a breach in all Commonwealth jurisdictions as well as in 
the United States, Weinrib’s theory suffers from a significant problem of fit. It does not admit 
of universal application.  
 
3. Rights theory 
 
Stevens rightly acknowledges that his theory faces a significant problem whenever cost to the 
defendant is taken into account by tort law.62 The problem arises because this consideration 
has nothing to do with the plaintiff’s rights.63 Since cost to the defendant is relevant to 
determining whether there is a breach of duty (a fact which Stevens notes64) in all of the 
jurisdictions with which we are concerned, Stevens’s theory suffers from a major problem of 
fit. In an attempt to mitigate this difficulty, Stevens seeks to discredit Posner’s economic 
                                                 
59  See, especially, Latimer v. AEC Ltd, [1953] AC 643, 653 659, 662-663 (H.L.). 
60  See, e.g., Botting v. British Columbia, (1996) 27 BCLR (3d) 106, para 30. 
61  John Fleming, The Economic Factor in Negligence, 108 LQR 9, 9 (1992).  
62  Stevens, supra note 9, at 92-93. 
63  One might argue that our rights depend at least in part on how burdensome certain conduct required by those 
rights would be for others. This is not, however, how Stevens perceives the rights protected by tort law. In his 
view, the rights protected by the common law “are inevitably derived from moral rights” (id. at 331). He also 
remarks: “[m]oral rights are capable of justification independently of their utility or consequences… 
Utilitarian or consequentialist arguments for their recognition … are otiose” (id. at 333).  
64  Id. (“it is observably true that in a claim based upon the defendant’s negligence, the courts take into account 
the costs and benefits of a defendant’s actions in determining whether he is liable”) (footnote omitted). 
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account of tort law,65 which champions consideration of cost to the defendant. However, this 
attempt to rescue his theory rests on a logical error.66 This is because even if Stevens’s 
criticisms of Posner’s theory are convincing, that would not support Stevens’s own theory. 
The fact that one theory is inadequate does not thereby make a rival theory acceptable. 
Stevens’s move, repeatedly made throughout his Torts and Rights,67 is akin to stating that the 
heliocentric theory of the universe (the theory that the sun is at the centre of the universe) 
provides the best explanation of the position of objects in the universe simply because the 
geocentric theory (the theory that Earth is at the centre of the universe) is flawed. It is a 
classic example of what philosophers call the fallacy of the excluded middle. The difficulty 
from which Stevens’s account suffers in relation to the breach element in negligence actions 
therefore remains and it means that his theory cannot claim universal truth.  
 
B. Negligently Inflicted Pure Economic Loss 
 
1. The law 
 
All of the jurisdictions with which we are concerned adopt different approaches to the 
recognition of a duty of care in respect of negligently inflicted pure economic loss. In 
Australia, the question in each case is whether the “salient features” of the proceedings call 
for a duty to be recognized.68 Salient features include the plaintiff’s vulnerability,69 the risk of 
                                                 
65  Id. at 93-97. Stevens’s assault on Posner’s theory comes from many directions. We do not address whether 
the assault succeeds because, as we explain, that fact is irrelevant to the success or failure of Stevens’s own 
theory. 
66  This point is Peter Cane’s: Peter Cane, Torts and Rights, 71 MLR 641, 643 (2008). 
67  Numerous illustrations are given by Cane: id. 
68  Perre v. Apand Pty Ltd, [1999] HCA 36, (1999) 198 CLR 180; Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v. CDG 
Pty Ltd, [2004] HCA 16, (2004) 216 CLR 515. 




imposing indeterminate liability,70 the control enjoyed by the defendant over the 
circumstances that led to the plaintiff suffering injury,71 the defendant’s knowledge72 and the 
need to protect individual autonomy.73 In Canada, the Anns test is used to determine when a 
duty of care arises,74 including in cases involving negligently inflicted pure economic loss.75 
According to the Anns test, the issue of whether a duty of care is owed is resolved in two 
stages. The first stage involves enquiring whether there is sufficient “proximity” between the 
parties. If the necessary proximity exists, the second stage becomes relevant, where it is asked 
whether there are any policy considerations which limit or exclude a duty.  
The position in the United Kingdom contrasts starkly with that in Australia and Canada. In 
the United Kingdom, a distinction is drawn between two types of case: (1) those involving an 
assumed responsibility; and (2) those involving what is often referred to as “relational 
economic loss”, (that is, pure economic loss caused to the plaintiff by virtue of the knock-on 
effect of the defendant having negligently harmed the property or person of a third party). A 
bright-line rule excludes the imposition of a duty in the second kind of case.76 A duty may, 
however, arise in the first type of case77 pursuant to the Caparo test78 or a test that asks 
whether the defendant assumed responsibility for the plaintiff.79 In the United States, a duty 
                                                 
70  See, e.g., Perre v. Apand Pty Ltd, [1999] HCA 36, (1999) 198 CLR 180, paras 32, 50, 106-113, 298-299, 
335-340, 395. 
71  See, e.g., Burnie Port Authority v. General Jones Pty Ltd, (1994) 179 CLR 520, 551-552 (Aust. H.C.). 
72  See, e.g., Crimmins v. Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee, [1999] HCA 59, (1999) 200 CLR 1, paras 
43, 46, 101-102, 233 (1999).  
73  See, e.g., Perre v. Apand Pty Ltd, [1999] HCA 36, (1999) 198 CLR 180, paras 114-117, 133, 300, 335.  
74  Originally developed in Anns v. Merton LBC, [1978] AC 728 (H.L.). 
75  Nielson v. Kamloops (City), [1984] 2 SCR 2 (S.C.C.); Hercules Managements Ltd v. Ernst & Young, [1997] 
2 SCR 165 (S.C.C.); Canadian National Railway Co v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co, [1992] 1 SCR 1021 
(SCC). 
76  Leigh and Sillivan Ltd v. Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd, [1986] AC 785 (H.L.).  
77  See, e.g., Hedley Byrne & Co v. Heller & Partners Ltd, [1964] AC 465 (H.L.); Henderson v. Merrett 
Syndicates Ltd, [1995] 2 AC 145 (H.L.); White v. Jones, [1995] 2 AC 207 (H.L.). 
78  Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, [1990] 2 AC 605 (H.L.); Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Barclays 
Bank plc, [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181, paras 53, 82-83.  
79  Hedley Byrne & Co v. Heller & Partners Ltd, [1964] AC 465 (H.L.); Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd, 
[1995] 2 AC 145 (H.L.). 
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of care will generally be recognized in respect of pure economic loss in assumption of 
responsibility cases.80 The position is complicated, however, as regards relational economic 
loss cases because of a diversity of views taken in different states. That said, most states adopt 
a robust exclusionary rule, which is often referred to in the United States as the “economic 
loss doctrine”.81 That rule is endorsed by § 766C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.82 This 
section states: “One is not liable to another for pecuniary harm not deriving from physical 
harm to the other”. Broadly speaking, therefore, the relevant law in the United States is 
similar to that in the United Kingdom.  
 
2. Rights theory  
 
Stevens starts his discussion of relational economic loss from the premise that the common 
law recognizes no general right to economic well-being.83 Given his belief that tort law is 
about the infringement of rights, he goes on to assert that, “[since] the infliction of economic 
loss does not per se infringe any right of the plaintiff … [it] is not therefore prima facie 
recoverable”.84 In making such claims, Stevens encounters significant difficulty in relation to 
the law in both Australia and Canada for in both of those jurisdictions such losses may 
sometimes be recovered. In Australia, as noted above, one may recover damages in respect of 
negligently inflicted pure economic loss according to the salient features test, while in 
Canada, such losses may sometimes be recovered under the Anns test. Stevens rightly admits 
                                                 
80  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 522(1). 
81  For a recent overview of the position in the United States, see Ronen Perry, Economic Loss, Punitive 
Damages, and the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 409 (2011). 
82  See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm (Tentative Draft No 2) § 7. 
83  Regarding this premise, see Kit Barker, Relational Economic Loss and Indeterminacy: The Search for 
Rational Limits in Torts in Commercial Law 171-172 (Simone Degeling, James Edelman & James 
Goudkamp eds., 2011). 
84  Stevens, supra note 9, at 21. 
22 
 
this clash with his theory.85 In an attempt to overcome the problem, Stevens criticizes the law 
in Australia and Canada. So, whereas he asserts the superiority of the English approach 
(according to which damages for relational economic loss is irrecoverable on grounds that 
chime with his rights theory), he denounces the leading Australian cases on relational 
economic loss of Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty v. The Dredge “Willemstad”86 and Perre v. 
Apand Pty Ltd87 on the basis that they comprise instances of judicial “radicalism”. This 
“radicalism”, he believes, inheres in the fact that the courts permitted recovery in them 
without “articulat[ing] any right [that was] violated”.88 In relation to Canadian law, Stevens’s 
criticism can only be inferred. While he does not discuss directly the relevant Canadian cases, 
he maintains that “the greatest 20th century judicial disaster in the law of torts was the 
decision of the House of Lords in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council”.89 And, of 
course, as noted earlier, it is the Anns test that is still used in Canada (thereby providing the 
means by which claims for negligently inflicted pure economic loss may succeed in that 
country). Thus, in relation to both Australia and Canada, Stevens’s message is clear: the 
courts in both of these jurisdictions have erred in their treatment of relational economic loss. 
The inference is that he thinks that the law in both countries ought to be changed. Stevens’s 
analysis, however, does nothing to rescue his theory. This is because his argument is a 
prescriptive one. Such arguments do nothing to keep the promise made by Stevens to provide 
an explanation of the law as it exists.90 If someone sets themselves up as the purveyor of an 
explanatory theory, as Stevens does, then their self-imposed task is to account for the law as 
we find it. In saying this we do not, of course, mean to suggest that scholars should not 
                                                 
85  Stevens, supra note 17, at 45-49. 
86  (1976) 136 CLR 529 (Aust. H.C.). 
87  (1999) 198 CLR 180 (Aust. H.C.). 
88  Stevens, supra note 17, at 49. 
89  Id. at 53. 
90  See the text accompanying supra notes 9-12. 
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engage in prescriptive analysis of tort law. Our point is simply that it is impossible to show 
that a given rule fits a purportedly explanatory theory by contending that the rule should be 
altered so that it conforms to the theory. 
 Stevens’s treatment of assumed responsibility cases is also suspect. In his view, the 
assumption of responsibility cases in which damages in respect of pure economic loss have 
been recovered are unproblematic because in such cases a right to economic welfare does 
exist. According to Stevens, the defendant’s objective manifestation of willingness to 
undertake a responsibility towards the plaintiff is a right-generating act by analogy with the 
rights created by gratuitous bailment and by virtue of estoppels and express trusts.91 In all 
such cases, according to Stevens, the fact that the defendant has voluntarily assumed a 
responsibility towards the plaintiff confers upon the plaintiff a right that the plaintiff would 
not otherwise have. On this basis, the assumed responsibility cases in tort are consistent with 
Stevens’s theory: the plaintiff possesses a right the infringement of which enables him to sue 
the defendant. A problem with this explanation is that Stevens offers no reason as to why the 
law in relation to bailment, estoppel or express trusts should be thought to provide a better 
guide as to the way in which tort law should be understood as handling voluntary assumptions 
of responsibility than, for example, the law of contract where, of course, gratuitous 
undertakings are not prima facie binding, and hence do not invest the promisee with a right 
that he would not otherwise possess. Stevens’s explanation is simply question-begging.  
 
3. Corrective justice 
 
The idea that torts are infringements of rights also plays an important role in Weinrib’s 
corrective justice theory, although it does not have quite the same prominence in his theory as 
                                                 
91  Stevens, supra note 9, at 10-11 and 33. 
24 
 
it does in Stevens’s (where rights occupy centre stage). Weinrib writes: “A right immediately 
signifies the existence of a correlative duty; harm or loss does not. Neither the harm as 
something suffered by the plaintiff nor the process of suffering it at the defendant’s hand 
establishes a link between the parties that is at once correlative and juridically normative”.92 
The fact that Weinrib embraces these propositions exposes his theory to essentially the same 
difficulty as that which afflicts Stevens’s when it comes to the law governing negligently 
inflicted pure economic loss. Frequently, courts across the common law world take into 
account factors beyond whether the defendant has infringed the plaintiff’s rights (if they take 
that consideration into account at all) in deciding whether to impose a duty of care in respect 
of pure economic loss. The focus is often on the fact that the plaintiff has suffered pure 
economic loss and on how to delimit the circumstances in which damages for such loss can be 
recovered. A regularly discussed consideration in this connection, and perhaps the most 
noteworthy for present purposes, is the prospect that recognizing a duty of care will impose 
indeterminate liability on the defendant.93 This is widely acknowledged as a reason for 
excluding a duty of care in respect of pure economic loss in circumstances where a duty may 
otherwise arise. This is highly problematic for Weinrib because judicial anxiety about 
exposing the defendant to indeterminate liability has nothing to do with the rights of the 
plaintiff. It is a unilateral consideration that concerns only the defendant. The fact that the 
spectre of indeterminate liability is a reason for excluding a duty that may otherwise exist in 
all of the jurisdictions with which we are concerned cannot be explained by Weinrib’s theory. 
This is properly conceded by Weinrib.94 
                                                 
92  Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice 51 (2012). 
93  See, e.g., Canadian National Railway Co v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co, [1992] 1 SCR 1021, 1137, 1153, 
1160, 1173, 1176-1183 (S.C.C.); Perre v. Apand Pty Ltd, [1999] HCA 36, (1999) 198 CLR 180, paras 32, 50, 
106-113, 298-299, 335-340, 395; Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Barclays Bank plc, [2006] UKHL 
28, [2007] 1 AC 181, paras 74, 100 (2007). 
94  Weinrib, supra note 92, at 56-57. Weinrib does not seek to mitigate the difficulty that the law presents for his 




   
4. Economic theory 
 
Posner contends that efficiency demands the denial of recovery in cases of negligently 
inflicted pure economic loss. In his view, such cases involve only private costs and no social 
costs. (On Posner’s definition, “a social cost is a diminution in the total value of society’s 
economic goods; a private cost is a loss to one person that produces an equal gain to 
another”.95) Because only social costs matter from his economic perspective – where there is 
no diminution in aggregate social wealth there is no behavior that needs to be deterred96 – 
claims in respect of negligently inflicted pure economic loss should be rejected. While this 
point about private costs and social costs is Posner’s main reason for taking this position, he 
also marshals several subsidiary arguments. Specifically, he contends that plaintiffs in pure 
economic loss cases are better able than defendants to quantify their loss ex ante97 and that the 
risk of indeterminate liability presented by such cases is a serious impediment to the prospect 
of efficient precaution-taking by defendants.98 We will assume that Posner is correct to say 
efficiency requires the law to let losses lie where they fall in pure economic loss cases. Yet if 
this is what efficiency demands, Posner’s theory encounters substantial problems. 
                                                                                                                                                        
economic loss as having suffered from a “jurisprudential decline” (at 57). Even if this claim is correct, it does 
not insulate his theory from the difficulty presented by the law.  
95  Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 737 
(2006). Much the same analysis is embraced in William Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OJLS 1, 4 (1982).  
96  Posner makes this argument by way of a hypothetical example in which access to A’s shop is negligently 
obstructed by B, and A’s loss of profits are matched by an equal gain enjoyed by rival store owners. There is 
no social cost because no goods are lost (they remain unharmed in A’s store) and prices do not rise because 
of a shortage since because “most retail establishments operate most of the time with a bit of excess capacity 
in order to handle peak demands”: Posner, supra note 95, at 736-737. 
97  “[E]fficiency may be promoted by shifting the legal responsibility for an accident from the injurer to the 
victim”: since the latter knows clearly what he stands to lose, he is necessarily “in a better position to avoid 
the loss by taking appropriate precautions or by buying insurance”: id. at 739. By contrast, a defendant would 
face huge problems associated with the ex-ante quantification of losses which would serve to “prevent [the 
defendant] … from determining how much it should invest in precautions” and make it “difficult, and indeed 
probably impossible ... to buy insurance against liability”: id. at 737.  
98  Id. at 739. 
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 In all of the jurisdictions with which we are concerned, tort law permits damages to be 
recovered in pure economic loss cases involving an assumption of responsibility in certain 
circumstances. Posner admits the difficulty that this poses for his theory in the course of 
discussing the decision of the House of Lords in White v. Jones.99 In this case, a testator 
instructed his solicitor to amend his will to include his two daughters as beneficiaries of his 
estate. The solicitor carelessly failed to follow these instructions with the result that the 
daughters inherited nothing. Property that the father intended them to receive instead 
devolved to other individuals. The daughters successfully sued the solicitor in negligence. 
Because the daughters’ loss was a gain to the beneficiaries of the estate, it was a merely 
private loss. Accordingly, says Posner, in such a case, “it is best for the judges to let the loss 
lie where it has fallen”.100 But this is not what happened. Like claims have succeeded in all of 
the other jurisdictions with which we are concerned.101 And, of course, the difficulty for 
Posner is not confined to disappointed beneficiary cases, but extends to all assumption of 
responsibility cases.  
 What is the situation with respect to relational economic loss cases? As we have noted, in 
the United Kingdom and the United States a strong exclusionary rule prevents damages from 
being recovered in such cases. This rule is consistent with Posner’s analysis. However, the 
law is very different in Australia and Canada. We observed earlier that in those jurisdictions 
                                                 
99  [1995] 2 AC 207 (H.L.). It might be doubted whether this case is properly understood as an assumption of 
responsibility case (consider, e.g., Peter Benson, Should White v. Jones Represent Canadian Law: A Return 
to First Principles in Emerging Issues in Tort Law 141, 167 (Jason W. Neyers et al. eds., 2007); Nicholas J. 
McBride & Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Law 191 (4th ed. 2012).). However, scholars frequently treat it in this 
way (see, e.g., A. Beever, supra note 18, 303; Kit Barker, Wielding Occam’s Razor: Pruning Strategies for 
Economic Loss, 26 OJLS 289, 290 (2006)), and this is how three of the majority judges in White regarded it: 
[1995] 2 AC 207, 268, 274, 293-294 (H.L.) per Lord Goff, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Nolan 
respectively. We proceed on the basis of this understanding. 
100  Posner, supra note 21, at 47. 
101  See, e.g., Hill v. Van Erp, (1997) 188 CLR 159 (Aust. H.C.); Earl v. Wilhelm, [2000] SKCA 1, (2000) 189 
Sask R 71; Graham v. Bonnycastle, [2004] ABCA 270, (2004) 354 AR 266; Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal 2d 
647, 320 P 2d 16 (1958). 
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relational economic loss claims are sometimes permitted. This result is, by Posner’s 
reckoning, inefficient. The clash with his theory is considerable.  
 
C.  Punitive Damages 
 
1. The law 
 
The availability of punitive damages varies considerably throughout the common law world. 
In some Australian jurisdictions, the circumstances in which they may be awarded have been 
severely confined by legislation. This legislation either abolishes them entirely102 or 
eliminates them in certain contexts, such as in claims in respect of personal injuries caused by 
negligence.103 In other parts of Australia, the availability of punitive damages is determined 
by the common law. At common law, punitive damages are awarded in order “to punish the 
defendant for conduct showing a conscious and contumelious disregard for the plaintiff’s 
rights and to deter him from committing like conduct again”.104 The law governing punitive 
damages in Canada is broadly similar to the Australian common law. The rule in Canada is 
that punitive damages “may be awarded in situations where the defendant’s misconduct is so 
malicious, oppressive and high-handed that it offends the court’s sense of decency”.105 The 
test for the award of punitive damages in the United Kingdom is much more stringent than in 
both Australia and Canada. The House of Lords in Rookes v. Barnard106 famously confined 
punitive damages to just three types of case. These are (1) cases involving oppressive, 
arbitrary or unconstitutional conduct on the defendant’s part; (2) cases in which the defendant 
                                                 
102  See, e.g., Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act (NT) § 19 (2003). 
103  See, e.g., Civil Liability Act (NSW) § 21 (2002); Civil Liability Act (Qld) § 52 (2003). 
104  XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd, (1985) 155 CLR 448, 471 (Aust. H.C.). 
105  Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130, 196 (S.C.C.). 
106  [1964] AC 1129 (H.L.). 
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acted with the intention of making a profit; and (3) cases in which an award of punitive 
damages is authorised by statute. In the United States, most jurisdictions permit punitive 
damages to be awarded, typically where the defendant’s conduct “constitutes an extreme 
departure from lawful conduct”.107 In many States, legislative caps on the quantum of 
punitive damages have been enacted and provision has been made for a proportion of any 
punitive damages awarded to be redirected to a government agency. In a few states, punitive 
damages can be awarded only when legislation authorises their award.108 The general picture 
that emerges from this mêlée is that punitive damages are available in all of the jurisdictions 
with which we are concerned, but that their availability differs considerably from one part of 
the world to another.  
 
2. Corrective justice 
 
The situation in relation to punitive damages poses an insurmountable challenge for Weinrib’s 
theory. Corrective justice, Weinrib tells us, involves placing “the defendant under the 
obligation to restore the plaintiff, so far as possible, to the position the plaintiff would have 
been in had the wrong not been committed”.109 It follows that punitive damages, which are 
not reparative in nature, do not effect corrective justice. This is rightly conceded by Weinrib. 
He writes: “under corrective justice damages are compensatory, not punitive”.110 The 
challenge that punitive damages present to Weinrib’s theory is more acute in some parts of 
the world than in others. The problem is probably most pronounced in the case of the United 
States, where punitive damages are generally awarded more freely than anywhere else.  
                                                 
107  David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 705, 730 (1989). 
108  For the details, see Dobbs, supra note 40, at 1074-1075. 
109  Weinrib, supra note 1, at 135 (footnote omitted).  
110  Id. at 135 n 25.  
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 Weinrib attempts to mitigate the problem from which his theory suffers in this regard by 
suggesting that, in at least some situations, punitive damages are properly understood as 
restitutionary damages. He points out that, under the second category identified in Rookes v. 
Barnard, punitive damages can be awarded where the defendant has sought to make a gain. In 
Weinrib’s words: “In Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] App. Cas. 1027 (H.L.), Lord Diplock 
explained this second category in terms of unjust enrichment. This explanation would make 
this category, at least, consistent with corrective justice’s treatment of illegitimate gains”.111 
Two things need to be noted here. First, this analysis does nothing to explain away the first 
and third categories identified in Rookes v. Barnard, or the fact that punitive damages are 
available in other jurisdictions in cases that fall outside of the second category in that case.112 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, it is abundantly clear that punitive damages are not 
restitutionary.113 Punitive damages may be awarded under the second category in Rookes v. 
Barnard even if the defendant has not in fact made any gain (a mere intention to make a gain 
can be sufficient to bring a case within that category).114 The test, as laid down by 
Lord Devlin in Rookes v. Barnard, is whether the defendant “with a cynical disregard for a 
plaintiff’s rights has calculated that the money to be made out of his wrongdoing will 
probably exceed the damages at risk”.115 The crucial issue according to Lord Devlin’s 
formula is the defendant’s motivation, not the result.116 Furthermore, even where a defendant 
                                                 
111  Id. Lord Diplock wrote that the second category in Rookes v. Barnard is “analogous to the civil law concept 
of enrichessement indue”: [1972] AC 1027, 1129 (H.L.).  
112  Rookes v. Barnard was expressly rejected in Australia in Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v. Uren, [1969] 
1 AC 590 (P.C. (Aust.)), affirming (1967) 117 CLR 221 (Aust. H.C.) and Canada in Vorvis v. Insurance 
Corp of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 1085 (S.C.C.). 
113  Even if they were, it is arguable that restitutionary damages are inconsistent with corrective justice. Consider 
Prince Saprai, Restitution Without Corrective Justice, 14 Restitution L. Rev. 41 (2006). We remain silent on 
this issue for present purposes.  
114  “I do not think that the argument that the defendant could not make a profit here defeats the plaintiff’s 
claim”: Archer v. Brown, 1 QB 405, 423 (Q.B.D.) per Peter Pain J.  
115  [1964] AC 1129, 1227 (H.L.). 
116  For an illustration of a case in which the defendant had a profit motive but made no profit yet was 
nonetheless required to pay punitive damages, see Drane v. Evangelou, [1978] 1 WLR 455 (Ch. D.). 
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has made a gain as a result of his tort, the award of punitive damages is calibrated according 
to the need to punish the defendant rather than the size of the gain made, which is what would 
be necessary in order for Weinrib’s attempt to accommodate the second category in Rookes v. 
Barnard within his theory to be viable. Hence, at least since Broome v. Cassell & Co Ltd,117 it 
has been clear that punitive damages awarded under the second category in Rookes v. Barnard 
will often need to exceed the defendant’s gain so that the purpose of awarding damages in 
category two cases, namely, “to teach a wrongdoer that tort does not pay”,118 will be 
achieved. Andrew Burrows notes that this “crucial additional point [shows] that damages 
under [the] second category are not concerned merely to reverse the defendant’s unjust 
enrichment.”119 For these reasons, Weinrib’s restitutionary analysis fails to explain away, 
even in part, the significant problem of fit that punitive damages present for this theory.  
 Weinrib also seeks to insulate his theory from the existence of punitive damages on the 
twin grounds that such damages are awarded only exceptionally, and that their very existence 
is contentious.120 He writes that punitive damages are “encased in controversy”121 and claims, 
further, that the House of Lords in Rookes v. Barnard “unequivocally repudiate[ed]” them as 
“anomalous” and “restricted their scope to the minimum allowed by precedent”.122 Weinrib 
also notes that punitive damages are unavailable in civil law jurisdictions.123 The apparent 
intention of this discussion is to paint punitive damages as a de minimis problem for his 
theory. We do not dispute the accuracy of any of the observations that Weinrib makes in this 
connection. However, we doubt whether they deal convincingly with the problem that 
punitive damages pose for his theory. It is true that awards of punitive damages are relatively 
                                                 
117  [1972] AC 1027 (H.L.). 
118  [1972] AC 1027, 1130 (H.L.) 1130. 
119  Andrew Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 414 (3rd ed. 2004). 
120  In making these claims, Weinrib’s analysis sits uncomfortably with his argument, just discussed, that 
punitive damages in the second category in Rookes v. Barnard are actually restitutionary damages.  
121 Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 55, 84 (2003). 
122  Id.  
123  Id.  
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rare in the United Kingdom.124 But this point does little to insulate Weinrib from the present 
critique given that his theory extends to all of the jurisdictions with which we are concerned, 
and outside of the United Kingdom the award of punitive damages is much less confined.125 
In the context of a universal theory, it is illegitimate to cherry pick the law of just one 
jurisdiction, especially when the law of the jurisdiction concerned differs markedly from that 
elsewhere.  
  
3. Rights theory 
 
The fact that punitive damages generally are available throughout the common law world is 
highly problematic for Stevens’s theory. Stevens is alive to the challenge that they present. He 
acknowledges: “it may be objected that that punitive damages are … inconsistent with a 
rights-based model of the law. If the courts are concerned to punish the defendant for his 
wrongdoing, it can be argued that this goes beyond mere vindication of the plaintiff’s 
rights”.126 Stevens responds to this challenge by contending that punitive damages, and 
compensatory damages, too, are a form of damages that are substitutive for the right that is 
infringed.127 The idea is that “[t]he more outrageous the defendant’s conduct, the greater the 
infringement of the right and the greater the substitutive award”.128 Stevens then draws his 
readers” attention to aspects of the law on punitive damages that are consistent with this way 
                                                 
124 “Punitive damages [are] a remedy of last resort”: Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, 
[2001] UKHL 29, [2002] 2 AC 122, para 63. 
125 “[I]n other common law jurisdictions, in particular Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States, 
punitive damages have continued to flourish”: Law Commission, Aggravated, Punitive and Restitutionary 
Damages, Report No 247 (1997) 104 n 567. This remark would now need to be qualified in relation to 
Australia in light of the later statutory changes in that jurisdiction: see Part IIC1 supra.  
126  Stevens, supra note 9, at 85.  
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
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of understanding them. Good illustrations (Stevens’s not ours129) include the fact that punitive 
damages are paid to the victim (in most jurisdictions) rather than to, for example, the state130 
and the fact that the procedural and evidential protections conferred upon defendants that are 
found in criminal law proceedings are not generally given to tort defendants who are sued for 
punitive damages. These rules make sense if the focus of tort law is on the violation of the 
plaintiff’s right. 
 However, as Stevens concedes,131 there are other rules governing the award of punitive 
damages that stand in the way of this interpretation of them. When these other rules are 
considered cumulatively, they show that punitive damages are not a species of substitutive 
damages. We note some of these rules here, not all of which are acknowledged by Stevens. 
(1)  It is well established that the defendant’s wealth is a material factor to consider in 
determining the quantum of punitive damages.132 This fact contradicts Stevens’s 
explanation of punitive damages. It shows that punitive damages are not driven by a 
concern to vindicate the plaintiff’s right. The economic wealth of the defendant has 
nothing to do with the plaintiff’s rights.  
(2)  The courts in awarding punitive damages take account of the need to deter the 
defendant and others from engaging in the conduct in question.133 This principle cannot 
be explained by a rights-based account of tort law. This is because it is aimed at 
incentivising the defendant and third-parties to act in particular ways rather than with 
ensuring that punitive damages vindicate a right enjoyed by the plaintiff.  
                                                 
129  Id. at 86-87. 
130  Cf. the position in some jurisdictions in the United States: see Dobbs, supra note 40, at 1075. 
131  Stevens, supra note 9, at 87. 
132  See, e.g., John v. MGN Ltd, [1997] QB 586, 625 (C.A.); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, cmt e. 
133  See, e.g., Broome v. Cassell & Co Ltd, [1972] AC 1027, 1073 (H.L.).  
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(3)  The fact that, in the United Kingdom, punitive damages are available only if the case 
falls within one of the three categories identified in Rookes v. Barnard134 is a problem 
for Stevens’s account of punitive damages. If, as he claims, they are awarded to 
vindicate the plaintiff’s right that was infringed by the defendant, why are they available 
only in the three situations recognized in Rookes v. Barnard? Those are plainly not the 
only situations in which, if tort is about the vindication of rights, a plaintiff’s right might 
be egregiously infringed.  
(4) In all jurisdictions, the courts must exercise restraint both in deciding to award punitive 
damages (they are “a remedy of last resort”135) and, if the decision is made to award 
them, in determining their quantum.136 The existence of this constraint is inexplicable 
from a rights-based approach. If egregious violations of rights require a larger award of 
damages than would be provided by compensatory damages in order to vindicate the 
right, punitive damages should be available as of right whenever there is such a 
violation.  
(5)  Stevens’s explanation cannot account for the fact that where the defendant has been 
punished by the criminal law (or by other means) in respect of the conduct about which 
the plaintiff complains, an award of punitive damages might be reduced or precluded 
for that reason.137 If the concern is with the vindication of the plaintiff’s rights, the fact 
that the defendant has already been punished ought to be irrelevant.  
(6)  Stevens cannot explain the rules that apply where there are multiple plaintiffs who are 
deserving of an award of punitive damages. The law here is that the court should divide 
                                                 
134  [1964] AC 1129 (H.L.). 
135  Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, [2001] UKHL 29, [2002] 2 AC 122, para 63. 
136  Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] AC 1129, 1227 (H.L.); Gray v. Motor Accident Commission, (1998) 196 CLR 1, 
para 20 (Aust H.C.).  
137  Walker v. CFTO, (1987) 39 CCLT 121 (O.N.C.A.); AB South West Water Services, [1993] QB 507 (C.A.); 
Gray v. Motor Accident Commission, (1998) 196 CLR 1 (Aust. H.C.). 
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the punitive damages awarded equally between the plaintiffs.138 This is inconsistent 
with Stevens’s rights-based explanation of punitive damages. It means that only by 
chance will the quantum of the punitive award reflect the gravity of the violation of any 
given plaintiff’s right.  
As we have noted, Stevens concedes that the evidence in favor of his explanation of punitive 
damages is not “all one way”.139 There are some aspects of the law on punitive damages that 
he can explain. However, there is a great deal more that he cannot explain. The clash between 
what the law is and his theory is significant. The simple truth is that unless the foregoing 
features of the law of punitive damages (several of which are not mentioned by Stevens) are 
disregarded, punitive damages cannot be brought within the scope of his rights theory. Allan 
Beever summed up the insurmountable obstacles that rights theorists face as a result of 
punitive damages when he said: “in awarding punitive damages, a court cannot be taken to be 
concerned with the rights of the plaintiff. The court is expressing condemnation of the 
defendant, but condemnation of the defendant does not imply vindication of the plaintiff”.140 
We agree.  
 
4. Economic theory 
 
Posner explains punitive damages on the ground that they promote optimal deterrence. He 
writes: “Tort … price[s] conduct that [it] wishes to discourage or at least regulate. The 
optimal price will sometimes exceed the harm to the victim”.141 Posner gives various 
illustrations of situations where he believes an award of punitive damages is required. He 
                                                 
138  Riches v. News Group Newspapers Ltd, [1986] 1 QB 256 (C.A.).  
139  Stevens, supra note 9, at 87. 
140  Allan Beever, The Structure of Aggravated and Punitive Damages, 23 OJLS 87, 99 (2003).  
141  Posner, supra note 21, at 54.  
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suggests, for instance, that punitive damages should be awarded where they are necessary to 
strip a defendant of a profit that he made as a result of the tort (that is, where the 
compensatory award is insufficient to eliminate the profit). He also argues that punitive 
damages are needed where the tort is “concealed” (Posner gives the example of a hit-and-run 
accident) and the probability of detection is consequently low. Where the probability of 
detection is low, punitive damages (or some other form of punishment, such as a criminal law 
sanction) are needed to ensure that the law sufficiently deters.  
There are overwhelming difficulties with Posner’s account. In the first place, he cannot 
explain why only the victim of a tort is entitled to sue for punitive damages. If the goal of 
awarding punitive damages is to ensure that people are optimally deterred, it is nonsensical to 
limit the right to sue for punitive damages to victims. The probability of a punitive award 
being made where one is required on efficiency grounds would be greatly increased if this 
constraint did not exist. In short, it is inefficient to permit only the plaintiff to bring 
proceedings for punitive damages. Beever notes that a possible reply to this point is that such 
a rule might provoke excessive litigation, and that a rule that permitted all and sundry to sue 
for such damages would therefore yield a net loss to society.142 However, the risk of excessive 
litigation is minimal given (1) the principle that the courts should proceed cautiously in 
awarding punitive damages;143 and (2) the many well-known legal devices that are in place to 
control excessive litigation.144 A second obstacle for Posner’s account is the fact that, with the 
exception of some jurisdictions in the United States, it is permissible to insure against liability 
                                                 
142  Beever, supra note 140, at 103.  
143  See the text accompanying supra notes 135-136. 
144  We have in mind here rules such as the loser-pays principle concerning legal costs (which obtains in most of 
the common law world), Part 36 offers under the Civil Procedure Rules (UK) (1998) and equivalents in other 
jurisdictions and restrictions on the ability of vexatious litigants to commence proceedings. We recognize 
that the loser-pays principle is not the default rule in the United States.  
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to pay punitive damages.145 This rule regarding insurance is inefficient since the person who 
needs to be deterred will not be made to pay. It is therefore inconsistent with Posner’s theory. 
Thirdly, Posner cannot explain the fact that, in the United Kingdom, punitive damages are, 
pursuant to Rookes v. Barnard, restricted to three categories of case. On his explanation, they 
should be available wherever they are needed to ensure that awards sufficiently deter.  
 
D. The Defense of Illegality 
 
1. The law 
 
There is considerable divergence in the law regarding the defense of illegality in the common 
law world. In Australia, both common law and statutory illegality defenses exist. The 
common law defense will apply if permitting recovery would be inconsistent with the 
legislative intention expressed in the criminal law statute that the plaintiff contravened.146 The 
statutory defenses147 are, overall, far more potent. The precise shape that they take varies 
considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but it is generally true to say that they apply 
where the plaintiff was injured while committing a serious offence and the commission of the 
offence was causally connected to the damage that the plaintiff suffered.148 In Canada, the 
                                                 
145  Lancashire County Council v. Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd, [1997] QB 897 (C.A.) (holding that it is 
permissible to insure against liability to pay punitive damages at least where punitive damages are awarded 
on the basis of vicarious liability); Gray v. Motor Accident Commission, (1998) 196 CLR 1 (Aust. H.C.). In 
some parts of the United States, it is permissible to insure against liability to pay punitive damages while in 
others it is not: see Dobbs, supra note 40, at 1063 for the details. 
146  Miller v. Miller, [2011] HCA 9, (2011) 242 CLR 446. 
147  Civil Liability Act (NSW) §§ 54-54A (2002); Motor Accidents Compensation Act (SA) § 47A (1999); 
Criminal Code Act (Qld) § 6 (1899); Civil Liability Act (Qld) § 45 (2003); Civil Liability Act (SA) § 43 
(1936); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act (ACT) § 94 (2002); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act (NT) 
§ 10; Transport Accident Act (Vic) § 40 (1986); Offenders (Legal Action) Act (WA) § 5 (2000). 
148  The details are given in James Goudkamp, A Revival of the Doctrine of Attainder? The Statutory Illegality 
Defences to Liability in Tort, 29 Sydney Law Review 445 (2007).  
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defense of illegality was severely confined by the landmark decision in Hall v. Hebert.149 
Pursuant to that decision, the defense will apply only where it is necessary to deny recovery in 
order to preserve the coherence of the legal system. The principal situation where the defense 
applies is where the plaintiff seeks damages in respect of a criminal law penalty imposed on 
him. The law governing the defense in the United Kingdom is in a state of flux.150 However, 
speaking very generally, the defense applies in the same circumstances as it does in Canada151 
and also where the defendant relies on his own illegality (or needs to rely on it) in order to 
recover.152 In the United States, illegality is not formally a defense,153 although the fact that 
the plaintiff was injured while acting illegally frequently will be relevant to other rules, most 
notably the doctrine of contributory negligence (or “comparative responsibility”, as it is 
generally known there in those jurisdictions that have abolished the all-or-nothing rule).  
                                                 
149  [1993] 2 SCR 159 (S.C.C.). See also HL v. Canada (AG), [2005] SCC 25, [2005] 1 SCR 401; British 
Columbia v. Zastowny, [2008] SCC 4, [2008] 1 SCR 27. 
150  This is primarily due to the fact that a flurry of recent decisions at the ultimate appellate level regarding the 
defense do not really engage with each other: see Gray v. Thames Trains Ltd, [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 
1339; Hounga v. Allen, [2014] UKSC 47, [2014] ICR 846; Stone & Rolls Ltd v. Moore Stephens, [2009] 
UKHL 39, [2009] AC 1391; Les Laboratoires Servier v. Apotex Inc, [2014] UKSC 55, [2015] AC 430; Bilta 
(UK) Ltd (in liq) v. Nazir, [2015] UKSC 23, [2015] 2 WLR 1168. For an assessment of some of these 
authorities see James Fisher, The ex turpi causa principle in Hounga and Servier, 78 M.L.R. 854 (2015); 
James Goudkamp, The Doctrine of Illegality: a Private Law Hydra, 6 UK Supreme Court Yearbook 254. 
151  The law in Canada was described in Gray v. Thames Trains Ltd, [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 1339 as 
adopting the “narrow rule”. It was accepted in Gray that the narrow rule applies also in the United Kingdom. 
See further regarding Gray James Goudkamp, A Long, Hard Look at Gray v Thames Trains Ltd in The 
Jurisprudence of Lord Hoffmann: A Festschrift for Leonard H Hoffmann ch 4 (Paul S. Davies & J. Pila eds., 
2015).  
152  Tinsley v. Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340 (H.L.) is often regarded as the main decision promoting the reliance test. 
It was said in Hounga v. Allen, [2014] UKSC 47, [2014] ICR 846 para 30 that that test continues to carry 
“maximum precedential authority”. There is also a statutory illegality defense in the United Kingdom s 329 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK). This defense is of fairly limited scope and we will leave it to one side 
in this article.  
153  See Robert A. Prentice, Of Tort Reform and Millionaire Muggers: Should an Obscure Equitable Doctrine be 
Revived to Dent the Litigation Crisis?, 32 San Diego L. Rev. 53 (1995); J.H. King, Outlaws and Outlier 
Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar in Tort Law, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1011 (2002). The leading 




2. Corrective justice 
 
In a footnote in The Idea of Private Law Weinrib concedes that the illegality defense clashes 
with his corrective justice theory. Recall that corrective justice is bilateral in nature, in the 
sense that it is concerned equally with both parties.154 Rules, if they are to be explicable in 
terms of corrective justice, must therefore be bilateral too. It follows that the illegality defense 
is problematic for Weinrib because it focuses solely on the plaintiff rather than on the parties’ 
relationship. As Weinrib puts it: “It is sometimes said … that a plaintiff who was negligently 
injured while committing an illegal act cannot recover. This defense is inconsistent with 
corrective justice, because illegality as such is not relevant to the direct interaction of doer and 
sufferer”.155  
The difficulty created by the illegality defense is most acute for Weinrib in the case of 
Australia and the United Kingdom, where the defense is relatively expansive. Weinrib might 
argue that the defense in Canada, which recognizes a much narrower version of the defense, is 
actually consistent with corrective justice. As noted, in Canada, the defense applies only when 
it is necessary to deny relief in order to preserve the coherence of the legal system. It might be 
thought that Weinrib can gain some mileage from this given the stress that he places on the 
law’s coherence.156 Weinrib suggests as much in the Idea of Private Law.157 However, it is 
doubtful that the law in Canada coheres with Weinrib’s theory. The fact remains that the 
defense, even in Canada, is triggered by a unilateral consideration, namely, the plaintiff’s 
offence. Furthermore, the need to maintain coherence in the law generally is also something 
that falls outside of the immediate interaction between the parties.  
                                                 
154  Weinrib, supra note 1, at 120-121.  
155  Id. at 169 n 53.  
156  See, especially, id. at 11-16. 
157  Id. 169 n 53. 
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Overall, Weinrib is correct to see the illegality defense as posing a significant difficulty for 
his theory of tort law. He does not offer a sustained argument in an attempt to explain away 
the difficulty, and it is doubtful whether the difficulty that the defense presents can be 
explained away. The clash between Weinrib’s theory and tort law on account of the illegality 
defense is unresolved. 
 
3. Rights theory 
 
Stevens does not discuss the illegality defense in his Torts and Rights beyond saying that he 
does not need to address it because it is not a rule that is specific to tort law.158 It is true that 
the defense is available throughout the law generally.159 However, we do not believe that it 
justifiably can be ignored by one who is offering a universal theory of the whole of tort law. 
This is primarily because in many jurisdictions the rules that govern the defense of illegality 
take on a distinct shape in the tort setting. The rules that control the defense in this sphere are 
often very different from those that apply in, for example, the contract law or trusts setting.160 
We are also of the view that the defense cannot justifiably be disregarded given its obvious 
and considerable significance in modern tort law. Ultimate appellate courts in several of the 
jurisdictions with which we are concerned have considered it repeatedly in recent years,161 
and it has caught the interest of several legislatures.162  
 Stevens, in our view, needs to account for the illegality defense, given his mission to 
explain all of tort law. We believe that he would be unable to do so. We have been influenced 
                                                 
158  Stevens, supra note 9, at 304-305. 
159  “[The defense] applies across the board”: Vellino v. Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, [2001] EWCA 
Civ 1249, [2002] 1 WLR 218, para 44. 
160  Compare, e.g., the principles developed in the trusts context in Tinsley v. Milligan, [1994] 1 AC 340 (H.L.) 
with those expounded in the negligence case of Gray v. Thames Trains Ltd, [2009] UKHL 33, [2009] 1 AC 
1339. 
161  See, for example, the cases mentioned in supra note 150 in relation to the United Kingdom.  
162  See supra notes 147, 152. 
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in this regard by a paper that Stevens himself wrote regarding the doctrine of contributory 
negligence. Stevens’s position in that paper, which is also written from a rights-based 
perspective, is that contributory negligence should not be an answer to liability in tort.163 The 
basic reason given in support of that contention is that the plaintiff’s conduct, so long as it is 
not an intervening cause, is irrelevant to whether the plaintiff’s rights have been infringed, 
and because tort law is fundamentally concerned with whether the plaintiff’s rights have been 
infringed, contributory negligence should be irrelevant. In Stevens’s words, “The reason why 
contributory fault should not be a defense is that the risks I run in relation to my own interests 
are nobody’s concern but mine.”164 Stevens correctly surmises that if what matters is the fact 
that the plaintiff’s rights have been violated (or, put differently, that the defendant has 
breached his duty), one would expect the plaintiff’s conduct to be immaterial, provided that it 
is not such that no right of his has been breached. This reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to 
the defense of illegality. If the focus is on the plaintiff’s rights, it should not matter whether 
the plaintiff was acting legally or illegally. But that is not the law. Stevens’s theory is, 
therefore, unable to account for the defense of illegality. This is a major difficulty for it.  
 A possible escape route available to Stevens is to argue that, when the illegality defense 
applies, the plaintiff forfeits his right. According to this line of reasoning, when the illegality 
defense is engaged, there is no right that needs vindicating, and it is therefore appropriate that 
recovery is denied. This is a rights-based account of the illegality defense. This explanation of 
the defense looks most plausible where the defense operates, as it does in some jurisdictions 
in certain contexts, not as a true defense but as a rule that prevents one or more of the 
elements the cause of action in which the plaintiff sues from being satisfied.165 Where the 
                                                 
163  Robert Stevens, Should Contributory Fault be Analogue or Digital? in Defences in Tort § 13 (Andrew 
Dyson, James Goudkamp & Fred Wilmot-Smith eds., 2015).  
164  Id. 253. 
165  See, e.g., Joyce v. O’Brien, [2013] EWCA Civ 546, [2014] 1 WLR 70, where the plaintiff’s illegality 
prevented the causation element of the action in negligence from being satisfied.  
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doctrine of illegality functions in this way, it may well be that the plaintiff, when the 
“defense” is triggered, has no right. However, it is clear that in all of the major common law 
jurisdictions the doctrine of illegality functions in at least some contexts as a true defense, and 
does not merely strike at the elements of the plaintiff’s action.166 This is so most explicitly in 
Canada, where it has been made stated explicitly at the highest level that illegality works 
exclusively as a defense and not, for example, as a principle that denies the existence of a duty 
of care.167 When the doctrine of illegality functions as a true defense, this forfeiture argument 
runs into formidable difficulty. This is because it depends upon the shaky proposition that a 
defendant ceases to be under a legal duty when a defense is enlivened. The accuracy of this 
proposition is dubious, and this is particularly so in relation to defenses such as illegality.  
 If one is under a legal duty, one has reasons supplied by the law (that is to say, reasons 
additional to whatever reasons exist independently of the law) not to act in a way that is 
contrary to that duty. It is strongly arguable that those reasons (and hence the duty) continue 
to exist, even if a defense applies. The point can be nicely illustrated by way of the defense of 
defensive force.168 Suppose that defensive force is used to kill a terrorist who was about to 
detonate a bomb the blast from which would have killed many people. Killing the terrorist 
was obviously justifiable, at least if he could not have been prevented from exploding the 
bomb by less drastic means. However, equally plainly, the fact that the killing of the terrorist 
was justifiable does not mean that are no reasons not to kill the terrorist. We have reasons not 
to kill people even if they are terrorists who are about to murder many innocent people. What 
we are dealing with here is a situation where the reasons not to kill the terrorist were 
outweighed by reasons in favor of killing the terrorist. Because the reasons not to kill the 
                                                 
166  The details are given in James Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences 126-127 (2013). 
167  Hall v. Hebert, [1993] 2 SCR 159 (S.C.C.). 
168  The illustration is taken from Kenneth Campbell’s important paper on conflicts of practical reasons: Kenneth 
Campbell, Offence and Defence in Criminal Law and Justice: Essays from the W.G. Hart Workshop, 1986 83 
(Ian H. Dennis ed., 1987). See also John Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in Philosophy of 
Criminal Law § 5 (2007), on whose analysis the discussion here also draws.  
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terrorist remain intact, so too must the duty that gave rise to them, even though a defensive 
force defense applies. This reasoning applies a fortiori where a non-justificatory defense is in 
play. Reasons created by torts to refrain from committing particular acts clearly remain intact 
(and hence the defendant still owes a duty) when a non-justificatory defense, such an 
immunity or illegality, applies. For instance, a person who is entitled to diplomatic immunity 
obviously has reasons created by the law not to commit a battery despite his immunity. He is 
still under a duty not to strike people. The same is true where the defense of illegality is 
enlivened. This means, of course, that offenders continue to have rights despite their 
offending. Accordingly, this forfeiture argument is of no assistance to Stevens.  
   
4. Economic theory 
 
The defense of illegality is an obvious and significant problem for Posner’s account. Tort law, 
Posner claims, imposes liability where the defendant is the cheapest loss avoider, this being 
the most efficient rule. However, in Australia and the United Kingdom the defense may 
prevent liability from arising where liability should be imposed according to this criterion. 
Suppose that D acts unreasonably (according to the Learned Hand formula) and causes injury 
to P as a result. The efficient rule is for D to be held liable. However, in Australia and the 
United Kingdom, if the plaintiff was injured while acting illegally, he will be unable to 
recover if (in the case of Australia) his illegality was causally connected to the damage about 
which he complains or (in the case of the United Kingdom) he has to rely on his illegality in 
order to establish his cause of action. There seems to be a significant clash between the law in 
these jurisdictions and Posner’s theory. A reply available to Posner is that the illegality 
defense deters criminal behavior by the plaintiff, and that, even though it means that the 
defendant is not deterred by tort law where it applies, there is a net gain in societal wealth. 
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However, this response is implausible for several reasons.169 First, plaintiffs are unlikely to 
even know about the illegality defense and therefore cannot be deterred by it. As Millett LJ 
observed in Tribe v. Tribe, the type of people who commit offences that are likely to trigger 
the defense are “unlikely to be … studious reader[s] of the law reports”.170 Secondly, even if a 
given plaintiff does know about it, it is doubtful that he would be deterred by it. If the risk of 
being both punished by the criminal law and suffering serious personal injury in the course of 
an illegal enterprise is insufficient to deter the plaintiff, it is hardly likely that the risk that the 
plaintiff might be denied a remedy in tort that he may have otherwise enjoyed will make a 
difference to his decision-making process. Thirdly, even if, contrary to what we have just 
suggested, the illegality defense may influence behavior, it may be just as likely to encourage 
offending as it is to deter it.171 Suppose that P and D steal a car and that P is injured as a result 
of D’s negligent driving. P is unlikely to be able to recover damages from D in either 
Australia or the United Kingdom.172 This makes such joint illegal enterprises cheaper for D 
than would otherwise be the case.  
 Can Posner explain the illegality defense in Canada? As noted earlier, the main situation 
where the defense applies in Canada is where the plaintiff sues in respect of the loss that he 
suffers as a result of having a criminal law penalty imposed on him. It is efficient for the 
defense to apply in this context. Assuming that the criminal law produces the optimal gain to 
society in terms of wealth by imposing a sanction, it must be inefficient for tort law to reverse 
what the criminal law has done. And even if the criminal law has produced a sub-optimal 
result, it is probably inefficient to have a second set of proceedings to correct the criminal 
law’s errors (the efficient thing to do in this situation would be for the criminal law to correct 
                                                 
169  Cf. the view of the Law Commission, which argued that the illegality defense can deter offending: Law 
Commission, The Illegality Defence: A Consultative Report, Consultation Paper 189 (2009) at [2.19]-[2.23].  
170  [1996] Ch 107, 113-114 (C.A.).  
171  This point has often been made: see, e.g., Tinsley v. Milligan, [1994] 1 AC 340, 368 (H.L.) 368.  
172  Miller v. Miller, [2011] HCA 9, (2011) 242 CLR 446 (Aust H.C.); Joyce v. O’Brien, [2013] EWCA Civ 546, 
[2014] 1 WLR 70. 
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its own mistakes via the appellate apparatus or for the criminal law to be changed so that it 
produces an efficient outcome). Nothing needs to be said here about the situation in the 
United States where no formal defense of illegality exists.  
 
E. The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and its Descendants 
 
1. The law 
 
The rule established by the nineteenth century case of Rylands v. Fletcher173 has evolved in 
different ways in different parts of the common law world. In the United States, it came to be 
understood as establishing a principle of strict liability that applies only to ultrahazardous 
activities.174 In the United Kingdom, the rule is not confined to untrahazardous activities175 
although it does impose strict liability. In Canada, the relevant law – at least in the common 
law provinces – is substantially the same as that in the United Kingdom.176 In Burnie Port 
Authority v. General Jones Pty Ltd,177 the High Court of Australia subsumed the rule in 
Rylands v. Fletcher within the law of negligence. The Court remarked: “The rule in Rylands 
v. Fletcher, with all its difficulties, uncertainties, qualifications, and exceptions, should now 
be seen ... as absorbed by the rules of ordinary negligence”.178 The rule does not, therefore, 
exist as a discrete cause of action in Australia, and situations in which it would have applied 
are determined by the tort of negligence.  
                                                 
173  (1865) 3 H & C 774; 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Exch), affirmed in (1868) LR 3 HL 330 (H.L.). 
174  In successive Restatements of Tort Law the rule spawned by Rylands v. Fletcher has been referred to as one 
concerning “ultrahazardous” and “abnormally dangerous” activities: Restatement of Torts §§ 519-524; 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm § 20. 
175  Consider Read v. J Lyons & Co Ltd, [1947] AC 156, 181-182 (H.L.) per Lord Simons. 
176  See, e.g., Tock v. St John’s Metropolitan Area Board, [1989] 2 SCR 1181, 1189-1190 (S.C.C.); Aldridge v. 
Van Patter, OR 595 (H.C.); Smith v. Inco Ltd, [2011] ONCA 628, (2011) 107 OR (3d) 321. 
177  (1994) 179 CLR 520 (Aust. H.C.). 




2.  Corrective justice 
 
The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, which exists in one guise or another in Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, clashes with Weinrib’s theory by virtue of the fact that it 
imposes strict liability. According to Weinrib, strict liability is incompatible with his theory 
since strict liability affords preferential treatment to plaintiffs whereas corrective justice treats 
the parties as equals.179 This clash between the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and corrective 
justice has not escaped Weinrib’s attention, and he seeks to show that the clash is merely 
apparent rather than real. He contends that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is “an extension, not 
a denial, of the fault principle”.180 He offers three arguments in this connection (none of 
which has, to the best of our knowledge, been properly tested by the existing literature). The 
first is that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher merely “limit[s] rather than eliminate[s] the 
relevance of culpability”.181 This is because, he says, some of the defenses that are available 
in relation to the tort “show… that culpability is still operative.”182 Weinrib identifies the 
defenses of act of God, vis major and act of third party. The second argument is that the rule 
continues the idea accepted by the law of negligence that the riskier the activity the greater the 
amount of care that is needed. Weinrib claims that at some point the activity is so risky that a 
“lack of care can be imputed from the very materialization of the risk”.183 The rule in Rylands 
v. Fletcher is said to constitute the law’s determination of the location of that point. The third 
argument is that the rule merely relieves “the plaintiff of the need to locate the specific faulty 
act” and that it cannot be implied from the fact that the activity in question was not an 
                                                 
179  Weinrib, supra note 1, at 177-179.  
180  Id. at 188. 
181  Id. (footnote omitted).  
182  Id.  
183  Id.  
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unlawful activity that “all of the defendant’s acts within the activity were faultless.”184 We see 
difficulties in all of these arguments, which we will mention in a moment. However, before 
doing this, we want directly to lock horns with Weinrib’s overarching contention that the rule 
in Rylands v. Fletcher is an extension of the fault principle and does not, properly understood, 
impose strict liability. The simple fact is that the authorities preclude this interpretation. The 
courts have stressed repeatedly that the liability regime instantiated by the rule is strict. For 
example, in Cambridge Water Co Ltd v. Eastern Counties Leather plc Lord Goff (who 
delivered a speech with which the other Law Lords all agreed) said that “the principle is one 
of strict liability”.185 Similarly, the California Court of Appeals in Pierce v. Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co said that “[t]he doctrine of ultrahazardous activity provides that one who 
undertakes an ultrahazardous activity is liable to every person who is injured as a proximate 
result of that activity, regardless of the amount of care he uses”.186  
 Weinrib’s overarching assertion is untenable given the authorities, but it is nonetheless 
worth understanding precisely why the arguments that he offers in support of it are 
unconvincing. His first argument is that culpability is made relevant by certain defenses to 
liability arising under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. The main problem with this argument 
is that, even if it is accepted, it would not follow that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is 
consistent with corrective justice. In order to demonstrate that the rule in Rylands v. 
Fletcher complies with corrective justice, it is necessary to show, relevantly, not only that it 
imposes liability based on fault, but also that the fault requirement is such that the parties 
are treated as equals. Merely because a given liability rule is based on fault does not mean 
that it complies with corrective justice, which is a point that Weinrib himself makes 
                                                 
184  Id. at 189. 
185  [1994] 2 AC 264, 302 (H.L.) 
186 166 Cal App 3d 68, 85 (Ct App, 1985) (emphasis added). That liability is strict in respect of the harm 
caused by abnormally dangerous activities across much of the United States is confirmed in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 20. 
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elsewhere in The Idea of Private Law.187 Critically for present purposes, the fault-based 
defenses to liability arising under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher mentioned by Weinrib do 
not result in the liability regime created by the rule treating the parties as equals. This is 
because the defenses are relevant only in limited situations. They will not necessarily apply 
in every situation (or even in most situations) in which the elements of the cause of action in 
Rylands v. Fletcher are present and the defendant is faultless. A good illustration of the 
point is Jones v. The Festiniog Railway Co.188 In this case, the defendants were held liable 
under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher in respect of sparks that escaped from a locomotive 
and that caused damage to the plaintiff’s land. Crucially, the defendants were held liable 
even though it was shown that they had taken all reasonable care and were hence 
faultless.189 No defense applied. Another example is Humphries v. Cousins.190 In this case, 
sewage escaped from the defendant’s land through no fault of the defendant and damaged 
the plaintiff’s land. No defense was engaged, and the faultless defendant was held liable 
under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. Many further illustrations could be given without any 
difficulty. The short point to take away from these cases is that, contrary to Weinrib’s 
analysis, the mere existence of fault-based defenses does not mean that the rule in Rylands 
v. Fletcher treats the parties as equals. Rather, notwithstanding the existence of these 
defenses, the rule generally affords plaintiffs preferential treatment, contrary to Weinrib’s 
corrective justice theory of tort law.  
 Weinrib’s second argument in support of the proposition that the rule in Rylands v. 
Fletcher is fault-based – that fault can be imputed to the defendant who is held liable under 
the rule given the dangerousness of the activity that led to the escape – is also unconvincing. 
                                                 
187  Weinrib, supra note 1, at 177-178 (discussing the incompatibility of subjective forms of fault with corrective 
justice). 
188  (1867-68) LR 3 QB 733 (Q.B.D.). 
189  (1867-68) LR 3 QB 733, 736 (Q.B.D.) 736. 
190  Humphries v. Cousins (1877) 2 CPD 239 (1877) (Common Pleas). 
48 
 
Weinrib simply does not tell us why he thinks it is right to impute fault to a defendant who 
commits the tort in Rylands v. Fletcher. However, even if he is correct in making this claim, 
this would not mean that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is consistent with corrective justice. 
Constructive fault is not the same thing as actual fault, and only a rule that is sensitive to 
actual fault treats the parties as equals. To say that a defendant who is not at fault should be 
deemed to be at fault does nothing to redress the favorable treatment that the rule in Rylands 
v. Fletcher affords plaintiffs.  
 Weinrib’s third argument for characterising the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher as imposing 
fault liability – that the rule merely relieves the plaintiff of the need to isolate a specific 
faulty act in a wider activity – holds no water either. Simply because the plaintiff in 
proceedings under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher does not have to prove that the defendant 
in committing a specific act was at fault does not mean that the defendant is at fault. There 
may be nothing faulty in the conduct of a defendant who commits the tort in Rylands v. 
Fletcher.191 The fact remains, therefore, that liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher 
may be attached to faultless conduct.  
 For the foregoing reasons, Weinrib’s attempt to paint the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher as 
being based on fault is unsuccessful. The rule in its various manifestations in Canada, the 
United Kingdom and the United States is one of strict liability and, as such, is incompatible 
at a fundamental level with Weinrib’s corrective justice theory.  
 
3.  Rights theory 
 
There is significant and growing theoretical support for notion that the rule in Rylands v. 
Fletcher does not involve any wrong and hence no violation of a right. The logic 
                                                 
191  See the cases mentioned in the text accompanying supra notes 185-186. 
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underpinning this view is that a person may be held liable for this tort despite the fact that, in 
accumulating, say, water in a reservoir, he complied with all relevant standards of behavior. 
As Peter Jaffey puts it: “[a] claim under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher … arises from a 
primary liability relation that allocates to D the risk of loss to [P] without imposing on him a 
duty to prevent it”.192 If this interpretation of the rule is correct, the rule presents a significant 
problem for Stevens’s theory. This is because it contradicts Stevens’s mantra that torts are the 
infringements of rights.  
 Stevens does not say whether he agrees with this understanding of the rule in Rylands v. 
Fletcher, but he tries in two ways to deal with the difficulty that the rule causes for his theory. 
He suggests, first, it is an anomaly; and, secondly, that it should be regarded as a subset of the 
law of private nuisance.193 Leaving to one side the fact that these claims are probably 
irreconcilable,194 neither one rescues his theory from the problem of fit that the rule presents. 
It is not altogether clear what Stevens means when he describes the rule in Rylands v. 
Fletcher as an “anomaly”. If he means by this that the rule ought never to have been created, 
he is making a prescriptive claim. For the reasons given earlier,195 such claims cannot rescue 
explanatory theories. They involve arguing that the data should be changed so that it fits the 
theory, whereas theories that seek to explain the law (which is how Stevens describes his 
theory) must take the law as it exists. If, by contrast, what Stevens means by describing the 
                                                 
192  Peter Jaffey, Liabilities in Private Law, 14 Legal Theory 233, 240 (2008). Other theorists who support this 
interpretation of the rule include Goldberg and Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 28, at 951 
and McBride and Bagshaw, supra note 99, at 468. 
193  Stevens, supra note 9, at 299. The implicit assumption made by Stevens in presenting this claim is that the 
tort of private nuisance is consistent with his rights theory. Stevens does not offer a sustained account of why 
he thinks that private nuisance is so explicable; he merely refers to the fact that it centres on proprietary right: 
Stevens, supra note 9, at 63. 
194  If the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is simply a subset of the law of private nuisance, and the law of private 
nuisance is consistent with Stevens’s theory, then there would be no reason for him to see the rule in Rylands 
v. Fletcher as anomalous.  
195  See Part IIB2 supra.  
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rule in Rylands v. Fletcher as an anomaly is that it is an outlier within tort law196 – and an 
outlier because it affords the plaintiff a cause of action without the defendant having breached 
any ex-ante private right held by the plaintiff against the defendant – then, again, he is on 
shaky ground. This is so because there is nothing particularly unusual (still less unique) in tort 
law affording a cause of action in the absence of an ex-ante private right on the part of the 
plaintiff. Many other torts do likewise such as the tort of causing loss by unlawful means, the 
dependency action afforded by the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (UK),197 the action for inducing 
breach of contract,198 the action created by the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 
1976 (UK),199 and the tort of public nuisance.200 Given these actions, it is implausible to 
contend that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is an outlier or in any way unique in constituting a 
tort that is not animated by the infringement of a private right held by the plaintiff. 
                                                 
196 This seems to be how Goldberg and Zipursky understand the rule. They describe the rule as a “sui generis” 
cause of action: Goldberg and Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 28, at 952.  
197 In Torts and Rights, Stevens rightly acknowledges that the tort of causing loss by unlawful means and the 
dependency action created by fatal accidents legislation are incompatible with his account of the law 
(Stevens, supra note 9, at 188-190 and 174 respectively). (The former is inconsistent with his theory because 
a plaintiff has no right good against a defendant to trade or economic welfare, and the latter clashes because 
dependency claims are parasitic upon the infringement of a right held by the deceased rather than the 
plaintiff.) Stevens attempts to mitigate the difficulty that these actions pose by offering reasons to tolerate the 
results that they produce. In relation to the unlawful means tort, Stevens argues that the action can be 
justified because it prevents the plaintiff from using third parties as a means to his own ends (id. at 188). In 
relation to dependency action provided for by the 1976 Act, he argues that allowing dependants to sue results 
in a closer approximation to the wrong not having been committed than would be achieved than if the award 
accrued to the estate (id. at 176). Even if these reasons are convincing, in neither case do they have anything 
to do with the plaintiff’s rights. These manoeuvres qua attempts to rescue his rights analysis from the 
difficulties presented by these actions are therefore mere distractions. They do nothing to change the fact that 
both actions are incompatible with his theory.  
198  In relation to the action for inducing breach of contract, Stevens argues – contrary to what the House of 
Lords held in OBG Ltd v. Allan, [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, paras 8, 45-64, 270, 302, 320 – that the 
tortfeasor is liable not on the basis of the accessory liability but rather on the basis of an ex-ante “accessory 
right” that we all have “good against everyone else that they do not induce the infringement of the contractual 
right[s] we hold”: Stevens, supra note 9, at 281. So, for Stevens, what the House of Lords were happy to treat 
as a mere principle of tortious liability is better seen as a tort strictu sensu. This interpretation is unavailable 
in the wake of the decision in OBG. 
199  Stevens admits that the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act (UK) (1976) confers an action where 
there is no right. He writes “that the plaintiff had no legal personality and consequently no rights at the time 
of the tort”: id. at 185. Stevens then discusses the history of the action and its scope. None of this has any 
relevance to his rights theory, and consequently does nothing to explain away the difficulty that this action 
presents. 
200 So far as public nuisance is concerned, Stevens admits (id. at 186-189), rightly, in our view, that many of the 
cases in this area are incompatible with his rights account. The major difficulty that Stevens sees with the 
cases is that they lend support to the view that the plaintiff must suffer loss over and above that incurred by 
the public generally in order to sue.  
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Stevens’s second argument – that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher has been subsumed within 
the law of private nuisance – proceeds on the assumption that the law of private nuisance is 
compatible with his theory. Stevens is certainly not alone in suggesting that the rule in 
Rylands v. Fletcher is part of the law of private nuisance. Statements to this effect have often 
been made in the United Kingdom, including at the ultimate appellate level.201 However, even 
if the action has been subsumed within the law of private nuisance in the United Kingdom, 
which is something that is hotly debated,202 this has plainly not happened elsewhere in the 
common law world. In Canada, for example, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and the action in 
private nuisance are separate.203 It is also noteworthy that the Reporters of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm regard the law of private 
nuisance as independent of the ultrahazardous activities rule (that is, the American descendant 
of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher). While liability may arise in both fields simultaneously, no 
suggestion can be found in the Restatement that the bases of liability have been merged.204 
Accordingly, even if Stevens’s claim that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is part of the law of 
private nuisance is an accurate description of the position in the United Kingdom, Stevens is 
still unable provide a compelling universal theory of tort law.205  
                                                 
201  See, e.g., Cambridge Water Co Ltd v. Eastern Counties Leather plc, [1994] 2 AC 264, 304 (H.L.) (“the rule 
in Rylands v. Fletcher was essentially concerned with an extension of the law of nuisance to cases of isolated 
escape” per Lord Goff); Transco plc v. Stockport MBC, [2003] UKHL 61, [2004] 2 AC 1, para 9, 52, 92 
(2004). 
202  See, e.g., Donal Nolan, The Distinctiveness of Rylands v. Fletcher, 121 LQR 421 (2005) and John Murphy, 
The Merits of Rylands v. Fletcher, 24 OJLS 643 (2004).  
203 In Smith v. Inco Ltd, [2011] ONCA 628, (2011) 107 OR (3d) 321, the Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged 
the way things had developed in the United Kingdom in Cambridge Water and Transco. However, it stuck 
steadfastly to the distinction drawn between the two actions in by the Supreme Court of Canada in Tock v. St 
John’s Metropolitan Area Board, [1989] SCR 118, paras 13-14 (S.C.C.). The court in Smith said (at para 68): 
“In Canada, Rylands v. Fletcher has gone largely unnoticed in appellate courts in recent years. However, in 
1989 in Tock, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously recognized Rylands v. Fletcher as continuing to 
provide a basis for liability distinct from liability for private nuisance or negligence”. 
204  See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 20, cmt c, where private 
nuisance is contrasted with the strict liability rule for ultrahazardous activities.  
205  Another attempt to relocate the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher that might conceivably be invoked in order to 
rescue Stevens’s theory is to contend that the rule is not part of tort law at all, and that it falls within another 
category of civil liability. This is how the rule is classified by, for example, McBride and Bagshaw, supra 
note 99, at 470. Their logic would appear to be as follows: (1) torts are wrongs that involve the breach of an 





4.  Economic theory 
 
In contrast to the theorists so far considered, Posner is considerably more at ease with the rule 
in Rylands v. Fletcher (or, more accurately, the American version of that rule concerning 
ultrahazardous activities). Writing with Landes, he maintains that the ultrahazardous activities 
rule is mandated “where achieving optimal accident avoidance requires altering the 
defendant’s activity rather than his care or the plaintiff’s activity or care”.206 In such 
circumstances, “a rule of strict liability makes economic sense”.207 Posner further argues that 
the tort of negligence would not offer an adequate form of regulation in such circumstances. 
In his famous article, “A Theory of Negligence”, Posner wrote:208 
 
 There is a serious limitation of the negligence system as a method of optimizing the allocation of 
resources to safety… [so the courts] carved an important exception to the standard of negligence 
for ultrahazardous activities such as blasting. Those are by definition activities where unavoidable 
accident costs are great, and therefore where one is most likely to find that an alternative method of 
achieving the same result (digging instead of blasting) is cheaper when unavoidable accident costs 
are taken into account. A rule of strict liability – the rule applied to activities classified as 
ultrahazardous – compels them to be taken into account. 
 
Given this stance, Posner cannot explain the law in all of the jurisdictions with which we are 
concerned. For in Australia, ultrahazardous activities are governed by the tort of negligence 
                                                                                                                                                        
require the breach of an ex-ante duty; hence (3) the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is not a tort. Because McBride 
and Bagshaw are not our target theorists for the purposes of this article, and because their relevant comments 
are very brief, we will not engage with their analysis. 
206 Landes and Posner, supra note 14, at 107. 
207  Id. at 111. 
208  Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note , at 76.  
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(into which body of law the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was subsumed, as noted earlier). So, 
although Posner’s account may chime with the rules in the Canada, the United Kingdom and 
the United States,209 he is unable to accommodate the Australian position given that, on his 
account, ultrahazardous activities require regulation by way of a strict liability rule. On the 
assumption that Posner is right here – that is, that he is correct to suggest that there is “a 
serious limitation of the negligence system” in cases of this kind – the law in Australia is 
inefficient.  
 
F.  Conclusion 
 
The theories of tort law that we have considered purport to explain tort law throughout the 
common law world, as we demonstrated by offering at the outset of this article explicit 
quotations or other very clear evidence from the writings of the authors of the theories in 
question. It has been argued that they do not achieve this goal when tested against the 
evidence in Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Five major areas of 
difficulty were discussed, namely, (1) the breach element of the action in negligence, (2) the 
law governing the recognition of a duty of care in respect of pure economic loss, (3) punitive 
damages, (4) the defense of illegality and (5) the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and its 
descendants. While the theories in question can sometimes explain the law in relation to some 
of these rules in some of the jurisdictions in question, when looked at as a whole, these five 
important areas of tort law reveal a wide gulf between the claims made about tort law by these 
                                                 
209  This is matter upon which he has himself remarked: “The Restatement’s definition of ultrahazardous 
activities ... coincides with the economic principles that make strict liability the preferred liability rule”: 
Landes and Posner, supra note 14, at 112. Certainly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 states that the 
relevant factors governing the ultrahazardous activities rule include the very high expected accident costs, as 




theories and the actual state of the law. Because of the size of this gulf, the theories concerned 
are not, contrary to what their proponents contend, satisfactory universal theories of tort law.  
 
III.  OBJECTIONS TO THE ANALYSIS 
 
The main conclusion of this article has just been summarized. In this final section we consider 
several objections that are of a general nature that might be made against our analysis. Our 
aim here is to show that these objections do not hit home. 
(1) Have the theories wrongly been seen as being without value? It might be argued that we 
have failed to notice the value in the theories that we have considered. We do not deny 
that the theories make important points or that they are obviously very valuable 
contributions to tort law scholarship. For example, Weinrib’s writings raised the 
consciousness of private lawyers generally to some major shortcomings of functionalist 
(or, more specifically, law-and-economics) accounts of tort law. In a similar vein, 
Stevens’s theory has done much to expose the inexplicability of torts that are actionable 
per se on a loss-based view of the law of torts. Nothing that we have said should be 
taken as suggesting that the theories in question have not significantly advanced our 
collective understanding of tort law. They all undoubtedly provide compelling accounts 
of sizeable parts of tort law, both within specific jurisdictions and across jurisdictions. 
The case that we have tried to make in this article is simply that the theories in question 
are unconvincing in so far as they are presented as universal theories of tort law. 
(2) Have aspects of the law that the theories can explain been overlooked? It might be 
suggested that we have not really noted aspects of tort law across common law 
jurisdictions that the theories in question can explain. It is true that this has not been 
done. But that is not our mission. Indeed, we concede that the theories are capable of 
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accounting for important parts of tort law in more than one jurisdictions. If they could 
not do this, it would not be worth subjecting the theories to sustained treatment; they 
would instead be discarded swiftly as self-evidently implausible. It follows that any 
suggestion that we have not taken seriously the strengths of the theories would be 
misconceived. Instead, it is precisely because we take seriously their strengths that we 
have thought it necessary to explore their weaknesses. 
(3) Are the theories really explanatory theories? The theories under consideration have 
been criticized in this article on the basis that they do not accurately explain the law. It 
might be argued that we are mistaken in reading the theories as explanatory. Several 
scholars contend that some of the theories in question are instead interpretative210 (and 
others say that they are ultimately prescriptive211). However, even if the theories are 
properly labelled as interpretive, we do not think that that would have any implications 
for our analysis, for at least three reasons. First and foremost, it is crystal clear that, 
regardless of the label that is used that the very theorists on whose work we have 
focused have battled hard to prove that their theory provides the best fit of the law. It is 
beyond serious argument that the great bulk of their relevant writings (and certainly 
those of their writings with which we are concerned for the purposes of this article) are 
aimed at showing that the law conforms to their account of it. We went to considerable 
                                                 
210  See, e.g., Allan Beever & Charles Rickett, Interpretive Legal Theory and the Academic Lawyer, 68 MLR 320 
(2005) (arguing that Weinrib’s corrective justice theory should be understood as an interpretive theory).  
211  See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note 25, 1532 (suggesting that Goldberg and Zipursky’s “project is a normative 
one”). See also at 1562. In his later work, Weinrib has exhibited a preparedness to criticise chunks of private 
law that are inexplicable in terms of corrective justice. Weinrib writes that one of the principal goals of one 
of his more recent monographs is “to criticize examples of legal doctrine that fail to adhere to the corrective 
justice structure”: Weinrib, supra note 92, 3. Weinrib commits himself here to the proposition that private 
law should be explicable in terms of corrective justice. It is irrelevant for present purposes that Weinrib has 
made prescriptive claims in this subsequent work. This is because this article is concerned with his 
explanatory theory of tort law (for passages in which Weinrib explicitly states to be advancing such a theory, 
see the text accompanying supra notes 1-8), and explanatory theories draw no support from prescriptive 
claims about what the law ought to be: see supra Part IIB2. Even if Weinrib were to abandon completely his 
explanatory theory in favour of a wholly prescriptive theory, that too would also be of no particular 
consequence for present purpose for the reasons given in supra note 28.  
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lengths to establish this at the outset of our analysis.212 We have done nothing more than 
question whether the theorists have succeeded in their endeavour. Secondly, we doubt 
that there is any material difference between explanatory theories and interpretive 
theories. Both types of theoretical accounts endeavour, ultimately, to search out 
meaning in the law. We observe that none of the theorists with whose work we engage 
relies on the postulated distinction between explanatory and interpretive theories. They 
may well regard that distinction being employed in aid of their theories as a disservice. 
Thirdly, even if there is a material difference between explanatory and interpretative 
theories, it is widely agreed that an important criterion for measuring the success of an 
interpretative theory is fit with the thing that theory seeks to explains. Ronald Dworkin, 
a pioneer in this regard, insisted that the first requirement of “any interpretation of any 
material” is that “it must fit that material”.213 Allan Beever and Stephen Smith – who 
have undertaken important theoretical studies of the law of negligence and the law of 
contract respectively – similarly have declared the significance of fit to interpretative 
theories.214  
(4) Are the theories really universal theories? It might be doubted whether, in asking if the 
theories in question are satisfactory universal theories of tort law, we have judged the 
theories against a standard which their authors never intended them to meet. Any such 
doubt would be unwarranted. We have shown at considerable length above that it is 
entirely appropriate to regard the authors of the theorists are offering universal accounts 
of tort law.215 Some of the theorists expressly indicate that the theorists are intended to 
be universal in their scope. Even if were inappropriate to read the theorists in the way 
                                                 
212  In the case of Weinrib, see the text accompanying supra notes 5-8, in relation to Stevens, see the text 
accompanying supra note 11, and with respect to Posner see the text accompanying supra note 15. 
213  Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Ambitions for Itself, 71 Va. L. Rev. 173, 177 (1985). 
214  Stephen Smith, Contract Theory (2003) 7-11; Beever, supra note 18, 21. 
215  See Part I supra. 
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that we do, this would be irrelevant, for it would still be worthwhile to determine 
whether the theories that they promote account satisfactorily for the law in most than 
one jurisdiction.   
(5) Are the theories impervious to objections based on a lack of fit with the law? A further 
objection that might be pressed is that the theories in question are immune to being 
criticized on the grounds that they do not fit the law. Murmurings, and arguably more 
than that, can be found in the literature to this effect.216 Such an objection would go 
nowhere. A theory that purports to explain something, including the law, fails to the 
extent that it does not explain the thing in question, at least if the mismatch between the 
theory and the thing is sufficiently great. Cane puts this point as follows: “[T]here must 
come a point where gaps between the explanandum and the explanans cast doubt on the 
value of the explanation ... [and in the realm of tort theory this matters] because many 
private-law theorists aim primarily for explanatory power”.217 Our article has employed 
this entirely conventional mode of legal reasoning. Indeed, it is precisely the same mode 
of reasoning that is employed by our target theorists. As we have noted in fending off 
the Objection (3), the very scholars who have proposed the universal theories of tort law 
in question are fundamentally concerned to show that their theory fits the law, and they 
all contend that rival theories provide a poorer fit. We consider the suggestion that a 
theory that purports to explain something is immune to being challenged on the ground 
that it does not explain the thing in question to be self-evidently untenable. It might be 
said that we have not identified the precise point at which a lack of fit becomes 
objectionable. This is true but it is unnecessary for us to isolate a specific moment at 
                                                 
216  See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 19, at 291 (suggesting that divergence between tort law and corrective justice 
presents no difficulty for his corrective justice theory of tort law); Beever, supra note 18, at 25 (contending 
that fit is just one of several criteria for judging a theory, and thereby suggesting that a lack of fit might not 
be problematic). 
217 Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay, 25 OJLS 203, 207 (2005). 
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which a want to fit becomes problematic. Given that our target theorists ultimately are 
concerned to show that their theories conform to the law, a significant problem of fit is 
something that necessarily causes difficulty for their respective theories. We have 
developed an extremely demanding test for significance and have discussed only 
problems of fit that satisfy this (probably excessively exacting) threshold.  
(6) Has the analysis not merely pointed out that there are inter-jurisdictional differences in 
tort law? Any suggestion that this article has simply trawled through differences in the 
law of torts between the major common law jurisdictions would reveal a fundamental 
misunderstanding of it. This suggestion also betrays profound confusion about the ways 
in which explanatory theories of the law justifiably can be criticised. We sought to head 
off such possible misunderstandings at an early stage.218 But some of the points that 
were made earlier bear re-emphasising. The aim of the article emphatically has not been 
to note differences in the law of torts across the common law world. Its goal, rather, has 
been to demonstrate that the universal theories of tort law on offer fail qua universal 
theories. This goal cannot be achieved simply by pointing to differences in tort law 
between jurisdictions. This partly is because a given theory might be able to 
accommodate different rules on a given point. In other words, more than one rule 
applicable to a given factual situation might be compatible with a certain theory. It 
follows that merely pointing to differences in the law between jurisdictions would not 
have taken the analysis anywhere, and this, hence, is not what we have set out to do. 
Rather, we have noted aspects of the law across jurisdictions that are incompatible with 
the theories under consideration. It just so happens that these incompatibilities are 
frequently the product of differences in the law. But such differences only are important 
for present purposes if they are left unexplained.  
                                                 
218 See the introductory paragraphs of Part III supra. 
59 
 
  It is important to understand in this connection that similarities in the law between 
jurisdictions can just as easily present a problem for the theories under consideration as 
differences in the law. Suppose, for example, that all four jurisdictions with which this 
article is concerned adopted rule φ and that theory Φ was unable to account for that rule. 
That failure would be evidence that theory Φ is an unsatisfactory universal theory of tort 
law. It matters not one iota that the failure is not a consequence of any differences in the 
law. We have, of course, utilised this logic in developing our argument throughout this 
article. That is to say, we have frequently argued that more than one jurisdiction 
embraces rule φ, that theory Φ cannot explain that rule, and that that failure therefore 
counts against the theory qua universal theory. To give just one example, we have 
pointed to the fact that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, which is materially the same in 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, is incompatible with Weinrib’s 
corrective justice theory.219 The fact that similarities in the law between the jurisdictions 
in question can equally present problems of fit for the theories, and the fact that this 
article has often referred used similarities in the law between the jurisdictions in 
developing the argument serves to emphasise that this article is not simply a search for 
differences in the law between jurisdictions. 
(7) If the article’s core claims are valid, has the article failed to indicate what tort theorists 
should be doing? It might be complained that we have not revealed our hand as to 
whether or not we think that it is possible to devise a satisfactory universal theory. It is 
impossible for us to prove a negative, that is to say, that there cannot be a satisfactory 
universal theory. However, we consider it to be extremely unlikely that such a theory 
could be devised, partly because of the demise of the view that there is a single common 
law throughout the world and the resulting diversity within the law of torts inter-
                                                 
219  See Part IIE2 supra.  
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jurisdictionally.220 What does this mean we think tort theorists should be doing? It is 
neither necessary nor, within the space available to us, possible, to give an adequate 
answer to this question. Doing so would take us far beyond the stated scope of this 
article. However, very briefly, our hope is that theorists will offer more nuanced 
theoretical accounts of tort law, or perhaps just parts of it, and that they will be more 
candid about the things that they are unable to explain.  
                                                 
220  The demise of that theory is discussed in Anthony Mason, Future Directions in Australian Law, 13 Monash 
University Law Review 149 (1987); Robin Cooke, The New Zealand National Legal Identity, 3 Canterbury 
L. Rev. 171 (1987); W.S. Clarke, The Privy Council, Politics and Precedent in the Asia Pacific Region, 39 
ICLQ 741 (1990); Robert Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey 317-320 (2003).  
